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Various sources of evidence suggest that dream frequency, intensity and vividness are increased 
with the use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRJ's) commonly prescribed for 
depression and anxiety. In this study the effects ofSSRI use on dream frequency, intenSity and 
vividness in psychiatric patients was examined through a comparision of the dream 
characteristics of an SSRI- medicated patient group vs. an unmedicated patient control group. 
Each group comprised 20 patients recruited through state psychiatric outpatient facilities 
affiliated with two research universities. Age and gender were evenly spread across the two 
groups. Psychiatric disorders represented were generalised an.xiety disorder, panic disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder and social phobia. Patients completed a questionnaire consisting 
of a most recent dream report and self-report likert-scaled questions regarding dream frequency, 
intensity, vividness and memorability. Two independent raters rated the dream reports for 
intensity on a likert scale. Self-reported visual vividness was significantly higher (p=0.027, effect 
size .86) among SSRI users compared with controls, whereas selJreported dream frequency and 
emotional intensity as well as independent raters assessment of dream intensity were not 
significantly different across the two groups. Findings of increased dream vividness without 
increases in dream frequency complement the results of an earlier study. Since serotonin is 
suppressed during REM sleep, these findings cast further doubt upon the notion of an isomorphic 
link between REl'vf sleep and dreaming and argue for the searchfor a more sophisticated model of 












A number of case studies and anecdotal reports have shown increased dream frequency and 
intensity in patients taking Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI's) for a variety of 
psychiatric conditions (Pace-Schott, Gersh, Silvestri & Hobson, 2001). Patients describe dreams 
that differ markedly from the norm in vividness or intensity, with one patient stating that her 
dreams "were so exiting she couldn't wait to fall asleep to find out what will happen" 
(Markowitz, 1991, p. 432). This is an unexpected finding given that SSRI's suppress REM sleep 
by up to 80%, and given the presumed association between dreaming and REM sleep (Hobson, 
Pace-Schott & Stickgold, 2000a). In this paper it is intended to explore the debate concerning the 
relationship between REM and dreaming, as well as to test the proposition that dreaming 
frequency and intensity are indeed increased by SSRI use in the psychiatric population. An 
outline of normal sleep architecture and physiology will serve as a backdrop to a detailed 
discussion of the most prominent theories of dream mechanisms, together with the evidence either 
supporting or contradicting the theories. This will be followed by a discussion of the literature on 
the influence of SSRI's on dreaming in order to show its relevance for the most established model 
of dream mechanisms. The next section will explore the action of various neurotransmitters 
involved in sleep and dreaming in order to avoid oversimplification in understanding the effects 
of psychiatric drugs on sleep and dreaming. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of 
problems with the research evidence as part of a general discussion on dream research 
methodology, and conclude that despite these problems, there is good reason to persevere with the 
dream research enterprise. 
Normal sleep architecture is characterized by two alternating states - Rapid-Eye Movement 
(REM) and Non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep. There are between three and six REM 
periods in a typical night's sleep with the first occurring around 90 minutes after sleep onset (SO). 
REM sleep occupies around 25% oftotaI sleep time. There are four stages ofNREM sleep, 
labelled stages 1 through 4, corresponding to increased depth of sleep (Rechtschaffen & Kales, 
1968). Stages 1 and 2 are sometimes called light sleep and stages 3 and 4 deep sleep or slow wave 
sleep (S WS), from which it is difficult to awaken (Perry & Young, 2001, Strauch & Meier, 1966). 
In NREM most physiological processes as measured by EEG and EMG are subdued compared 











by lower heart rates, blood pressure and respiratory rates. By contrast REM is characterized by a 
more aroused physiological state with rapid eye movements, vvhich are the main identifying 
feature of the REM state. In REM there is also a dramatic reduction in muscle tone, 'near total 
paralysis of the postural muscles' and genital engorgement (Kaplan & Saddock, 2003, p.758). 
1.1. Expianator.v mo(lels of sleep and dreaming 
1.1.1. REA! sleep and dreams 
It was initially supposed that dreaming and REM sleep were synonymous (Solms, 2002, Strauch 
& Meier. 1996), so much so that REM came to be known as 'dream sleep' (00mhof1 1966). 
David Foulkes found in the early 1960's that dream reports could also be obtained from NREM 
sleep. though he noted that these NRE\1 dreams appeared qualitatively different from REM 
dreams, being more thought-like and realistic or plausible, and lacking the elaborate narrative or 
bizarre qualities we commonly associate with dreaming (Foulkes. 1962; Monroe. Rechtshaffen, 
Foulkes & Jensen. 1965). It is now \videly acknowledged that around 75-90% of dreams occur in 
REM sleep but also that some form of dreaming does occur in NREM sleep, and it has become 
increasingly apparent that despite reports of qualitative differences between REM and NREM 
dreams. there is sufficient dreamlike mental activity occurring in NREM to pose a challenge to 
the accepted assumptions around dreaming and REM as isomorphic entities. Since this debate 
forms the backdrop to the present research, it \vill be necessary to examine the three most 
prominent models of dream physiology in some detail. 
1.1.2. Hobson's RElvf-dreaming paradigm 
Hobson has spent much of his research career since the 1960' s developing models in the field of 
sleep and dreaming, beginning with his early activation-synthesis model in which dreams were 
considered an epiphenomenon of REM. This early model proposed that firing of pontine 
cholinergic cells activated the forebrain during REM sleep, and that this random activation of 
sensory and motor systems was then synthesized to produce dreams (McCarley & Ilobsol1. 1979). 
Hobson and his fellow researchers had shown that REM sleep could be induced in rats by 
cholinergic agents through an experiment in \vhich REM was increased after injecting cholinergic 
agents into the pedunculopontine region of the brainstem (Hobson et ai, 2000). The component of 











Kleitman in the 1950's who had first noticed an association between REM sleep and dreaming 
(Hobson et aL 2000a). Hobson based his dreaming model on the assumption that this association 
represented an isomorphism. Therefore, in this model, dreams were hypothesized to originate as a 
result of 'noise' generated by the random activity of these cholinergic pontine neurons (Strauch & 
Meier. 1996). Accordingly, the content of dreams was held to be intrinsically meaningless, or 
'motivationally neutral' (McCarley & Hobson, 1979, p.86), turning on their heads widely held 
views of dreams as meaningful, wishful or necessary, whether from psychodynamic roots or 
'folk' belief. Despite some disagreement in the field at that time. this theory and its basic premise 
of an isomorphic relationship betvveen REM sleep and dreaming became the received view in 
sleep and dreaming research. This is despite the fact that opponents of the activation-synthesis 
model such as David Foulkes consistently pointed out that NREM sleep also yielded dream 
reports. in many cases indistinguishable from those found in REM, particularly toward the later 
stages of the night. 
1.1.2.1. Differences between REM and NREA! dreams 
The debate around the existence ofNREM dreams for the most part focused on whether these 
dreams are really dreams or simply incidents of sleep mentation. Failure to replicate research 
findings that supported one or the other position has been attributed to differences in what 
qualified as a dream (Herman, Ellman & Roffwarg, 1978). It was argued by Hobson and others 
(Hobson et aL 2000a. Monroe et al, ] 965) that independent raters can distinguish the average 
REM from NREM dream since REM reports are longer and more vivid and NREM dreams more 
similar to waking thought. The typical REM dream is described as hallucinatory, bizarre. 
delusional, lacking in self-reflection and orientational stability, and as having increased emotion. 
These qualities Hobson claimed are found in the majority of REM but rarely in NREM dreams 
(Hobson et al.. 2000a). Some researchers claimed that the longer the NREM dream, the more 
closely it resembles the REM dream. but that NREM dreams are often shorter. They claim that if 
the researcher controls for dream length, the other differences tend to disappear (Strauch & Meier. 
1996. Cavallero. 2000). A number of authors have etTectively countered this by saying that it is 
precisely because these NREM dreams are more mundane and thought-like that they are shorter. 
not the other way round. Dreams that lack narrative complexity or bizarre imagery will of 











Antrobus (1983,1993) postulated that reported differences between REM and NREM dreams 
might simply be an artifact of differences in ease of retrieval due to physiological differences in 
attention and memory across the two states. Acetylcholine is suppressed in NREM, which would 
support his hypothesis, as it is strongly implicated in memory retrievaL NREM is also 
accompanied by a far lower level of brain functioning overall than is REM (Schredl, 2000). 
Conduit, Crewther and Coleman (2000) point out that all we can assert is that there appear to be 
differences in the ability to recall NREM dreams on awakening. This view is consistent with the 
observation that arousals from slow wave sleep (NREM stages 3 and 4) are associated with 
disorientation and disorganized thinking but also with 'amnesia for events that occur during the 
arousal' (Kaplan & Saddock, 2003, p.756). Hobson et aL (2000a) concede that differences could 
be on the basis of differences in memory processes across the two stages but also state this is 
unlikely and still needs to be proved. 
Nowadays few authors would dispute the fact that on average there are distinct differences 
between REM and NREM dream reports, but many have continued to challenge Hobson to 
account for the fact that it is possible to obtain dreams that are indistinguishable from REM 
dreams, from NREM sleep. Hobson, Pace-Schott & Stickgold (2000b) have argued that where 
dreaming does occur outside REM, it occurs in the parts ofNREM that are closest in time to 
REM, and therefore subject to overlap with REM states. Vogel (2000) refutes this, stating that 
NREM dreaming is not increased during the pre-REM period as Hobson suggests. Nielsen 
(2000a) also showed that the most vivid NREM reports can be obtained from early sleep onset 
stages, or stage I sleep (90 minutes prior to the first REM stage) and that these are often 
indistinguishable from REM dream reports. In response to mounting evidence that NREM dreams 
are not simply carryover effects from REM, Hobson and his team have developed a more 
sophisticated model, called the AIM model, or Activation-Input-Modulation model, which posits 
a three dimensional model of dreaming, and have now (mostly) modified their claims to assert 
only that dreaming is more likely to occur in REM, as the physiological characteristics of this 
state are most favourable to the production of dreaming. 











In this revised model, the' Activation' dimension refers to the brain's activation level, being 
greater when we are awake than asleep, and greater in REM than in NREM. The second 
dimension, Input, refers to sources of information, this includes feedback sources of input. 
Modulation refers to the changes in neurotransmitter levels that influence brain states, most 
importantly cholinergic, serotonergic and noradrenergic innervation or suppression (dopamine is 
not considered an important component). It was shown through experiments with rats that 
serotonin and noradrenalin reduced REM sleep, and that injections of serotonin agonists reduced 
REM in cats (Hobson et aI, 2000a), similarly, an almost universal suppression of REM has been 
found in humans using antidepressants whose mode of action is to increase levels of the amines 
serotonin and noradrenalin (Galliard, Nicholson & Pascoe, 1994). The cholinergic-aminergic 
mediation of REM and NREM has thus become generally established. 
Critics of the revised AIM model have argued that there is no empirical support for a three 
dimensional model (why three for example and not four [Hartmann, 2000]), and that the model is 
just that - a model, though a plausible description, it is not a scientific explanation of dreaming 
(Antrobus, 2000). Perhaps the strongest criticism that is leveled at the AIM model is that in much 
of his VvTiting Hobson still clings to the old REM=dreaming isomorphism (Hartmann, 2000) 
despite the evidence for vivid dreaming outside REM. For example, in their response to various 
authors' commentary on one of their articles (Hobson et al. 2000a), Hobson et al (2000b) still 
maintain their stated preference for the term 'sleep mentation' as opposed to 'dreaming' for 
dreaming that occurs outside REM sleep on the grounds that dreaming occurs more often in REM 
and that dreams outside REM are usually more mundane. 
1.1.3. Solms - REH and dreaming are dissociable states 
1.1. 3.1. The lesion studies 
The strongest argument against Hobson's REM-dreaming isomorphic model came from lesion 
studies that showed that it is possible to have REM sleep without dreaming as well as dreaming in 
the absence of REM sleep (Solms, 1997). While Solms subscribes, along with Hobson, to the 
monist perspective that argues for the necessity of searching for psychophysiological correlates 
for phenomenological experience, these studies convinced Solms that whatever the 











notwithstanding the fact that dreaming is far more commonly observed in conjunction with REM 
than it is with NREM. Solms' review of the extant literature, together with his own clinico-
anatomical data showed that there are two lesion sites which are known to obliterate dreaming. 
These are either bilateral lesions in the deep white matter surrounding the anterior horns of the 
lateral ventricles or lesions of the parieto-temporal-occipital junction (PTO) in either cerebral 
hemisphere (Solms, 1997). Solms reported 100 cases of loss of dreaming in total, of which 94 
were PTO, some (83) unilateral and some (11) bilateral, and the remaining 16 were around the 
anterior horns of the lateral ventricles, always bilaterally. In addition, Solms argued that lesions in 
the brainstem areas that obliterate REM do not cause cessation of dreaming. Solms therefore 
claimed that REM and dreaming are doubly dissociable states (Solms, 2000a). Aside from 
sUbjective reports of cessation of dreaming (which might arguably be an artifact of morning 
forgetting of nighttime dreaming) Solms (2000a) presents as additional evidence the fact that 
during experiments in which subjects with such forebrain lesions were repeatedly awakened 
during REM, there were no dream reports elicited. Solms points out that this recent experimental 
evidence had however already been anticipated by reports in the psychiatric literature to the effect 
that prefrontalleucotomy to control the hallucinations and delusions in schizophrenic patients 
also led to global cessation of dreaming, a finding which took some time to reach the dream 
research community (Solms, 2000a). Almost 1000 instances have been reported ofloss of 
dreaming following these ventromesial frontal lesions. 
1.1.3. 2. The role of the forebrain and dopaminergic circuits 
On purely common sense grounds it seems unsurprising that lesions in the PTO area an area in 
which visual association takes place - render mental imagery in the form of dreaming impossible. 
These patients also report impaired mental imagery in waking life. The role of the frontal 
ventromesial area in dreaming is less self~evident, and lends itself to theoretical exploration. 
Solms points out that there are strong connections between this area of the frontal lobes and 
limbic structures, and that damage along this pathway leads to reduced initiative, imagination and 
ability to plan ahead. The ventromesial quadrant of the frontal lobes is also the target of 
antipsychotic medication. Antipsychotics designed to inhibit activity along this pathway result in 
the reduction of dreaming together with reduction of positive psychotic symptoms such as 
hallucinations and delusions (Solms, 2000a). Experiments with L-dopa, which activate this 











REM physiology (Solms, 2000a). Solms also argues that limbic forebrain stimulation can invoke 
(REM-like) dreaming in the absence of changes in REM frequency, duration or intensity. He thus 
poses an alternative theory for dreaming generation: that dreaming is attributable to activation of 
meso cortical dopaminergic projections from the ventral tegmental area, a collection of structures 
and networks knovm as the 'seeking' system in Panksepp's terminology (Solms, 1997). 
Hobson et a1. (2000b) have countered that the pathway from the ventral tegmental area through 
the limbic system to the ventromesial area ofthe fromallobes is not exclusively dopaminergic, 
and that to focus on this neurotransmitter to the exclusion of others is too narrow an approach. It 
has long been thought that levels of dopamine do not change significantly between waking and 
sleeping which may account for its disregard in Hobson's AIM model despite the link between 
the positive symptoms of psychosis and dopamine, which might otherwise have suggested a 
possible role for dopamine in dreaming. Hobson et a1. (2000b) argue that stimulation of dopamine 
production does not always enhance dreaming; for example administration of sulpiride, an 
antipsychotic and dopamine antagonist enhanced dream recall, contrary to expectations. The 
Hobson team (2000b) also pointed out that research into the dreaming of Parkinson's disease 
patients has produced equivocal results, with a variety of changes in dreaming reported. This 
unexpected finding is hypothesized to be due to the fact that there are different brain distributions 
of the different receptor subtypes from one individual to another, whose respective roles are as yet 
not completely understood. 
It is not clear that Solms does in fact claim an exclusive role for dopamine in dreaming. In 
summarizing his views regarding the normal dreaming process, he states that since limbic seizure 
activity in NREM sleep increases dreaming, and since dreaming is more likely in a more aroused 
brain-state (REM) and that stimulation of dopaminergic appetitive circuits can stimulate 
dreaming, these lines of evidence converge, suggesting 'that anything (my emphasis) that arouses 
the sleeping brain can initiate the process of dreaming.' (Solms, 1997, p.244). In a more recent 
text, Solms (2001) suggests an interplay between dopaminergic, cholinergic, serotonergic and 
noradrenergic systems in dream generation, as suggested by Gottesmann's monoaminergic 
disinhibition hypothesis. Gottesmann (2001) argued that despite the fact that dopamine levels are 
steadily maintained throughout the sleep-wake cycle, the relative suppression of other aminergic 
neurons during REM (such as noradrenalin and serotonin) might act to increase the influence of 











dopamine when activated are inactive during REM sleep, thus resulting in a relative excess of 
dopamine. Gottesmann concludes that any account of dreaming must consider a central role for 
dopamine. Perry and Piggott (2001) propose a similar model of dreaming that could account for 
differences in REM and NREM dreaming based on relative levels of dopamine, serotonin, 
noradrenalin and acetylcholine, which they have dubbed the 'multitransmitter hypothesis'. 
The view that dopamine levels remain relatively steady across the sleep-wake-cycle has recently 
been challenged by evidence that although forebrain dopamine is higher during waking than REM 
or slow wave sleep, dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens of rats is highest during REM 
sleep, as compared with waking and slow wave sleep (Lena, Muffat, Deschaux, Parrot, Sauvinet, 
Suaud-Chagny, Renaud & Gottesmann, 2004). This is an important finding given the reported 
involvement of the nucleus accumbens in the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (Lena et aI, 
2004). 
1.1.3.3. Challenges to the forebrain dream generator theory 
Solms's claim that lesions in the ventromesial quadrant of the forebrain cause cessation of 
dreaming is now almost universally accepted, though it has been pointed out that lesions here 
only caused cessation of dreaming around 85% of the time. According to Ogilvie, Takeuchi, and 
Murphy (2000) this leaves a problem regarding the other 15%, which they argued should also 
experience cessation of dreaming if this area is obligatory for dreaming to take place. Solms 
(1997) had however already pointed out that like many other neuropsychological (and indeed 
neurological) symptoms, cessation of dreaming is typically experienced in the acute stage, and 
may recover to some degree in the chronic stage. In patients with prefrontalleucotomy, those in 
whom dreaming returned had a poorer prognosis, as this tended to coincide with the return of 
psychotic symptoms (Solms, 1997). The finding of cessation of dreaming with lesions in the 
ventromesial region is now generally accepted. But is it the case that bilateral ventromesial or 
PTO lesions disturb the process of dreaming itself, or rather the ability to structure the experience 
into a verbal report and/or the motivation to supply this report? Doricchi and Violani (2000) point 
out that between dream and dream report, various activities must take place, involving memory, 
language, affect, motivation as well as visual-spatial imagery. These are not fragmented processes 
but involve many parts of the brain working together (Greenberg, 2000). Lesions in pathways 











theoretically result in the inability to obtain dream reports. Feinberg (2000) has suggested that 
patients with lesions in either of Solms' s proposed lesion areas would also be entitled to memory 
deficits that could interrupt the dream report production endeavour. 
Solms (1997) seems to have anticipated some of these criticisms in pointing out that loss of 
dreaming does not correlate with either loss of memory or loss of speech. Patients with either 
bilateral ventromesial or PTa lesions would not be typically described as densely amnesic either; 
it would be far more likely to expect such patients to produce a disorganized or sparse dream 
report than to positively claim that they no longer dream. In addition, patients' claims regarding 
loss of dreaming are backed up by laboratory studies in which REM awakenings in braiu. 
damaged patients who claimed to no longer dream, produced no dream reports, thus validating 
their claims (Domhoff, 2003). Therefore Solms' finding of cessation of dreaming with forebrain 
lesions has been a substantial contribution to current dream theorizing, as demonstrated by 
Gottesman's (2000, p.942) statement that forebrain generators of dreaming 'now seem self 
evident'. 
1.1.3.4. Pontine lesions cessation of REM without cessation of dreaming? 
Solms (1997) claim for evidence that pontine lesions causing cessation of REM do not necessarily 
cause cessation of dreaming is by contrast not universally accepted (Gottesman, 2000). Various 
authors argue that this claim cannot be adequately tested since to eliminate a pontine area large 
enough to cause cessation of REM would either eliminate consciousness (Domhoff, 2003) or at 
best severely curtail the ability to communicate (Hobson et aI., 2000a). The prevailing view seems 
to be that this is probably not a testable proposition and that insufficient evidence exists to support 
the view that cessation of REM does not lead inevitably to cessation of dreaming. Solms concurs 
that this is difficult to establish empirically (2000c), nevertheless he maintains that a small 
number of his patients demonstrated unequivocally that dreaming was maintained where 
brainstem lesions had been shown to eliminate REM (personal communication, 2005). Solms also 
points out that it has never been shown that loss of dreaming occurs in conjunction with cessation 
of REM (Solms, 1997). 











To contrast the essence of Solms' position with that of Hobson, Solms subscribes to a 'one-
generator' model of dreaming, in which regardless of which stage of sleep, the mechanisms that 
generate dreaming are the same. Hobson argues there is one generator for REM dreaming, which 
he has elaborated in some detail and a separate mechanism for NREM dreaming, which remains 
relatively unexplored in his model. Moreover, Solms argues that the mechanisms which generate 
dreaming are not brainstem mediated, but forebrain mediated as suggested by the lesion studies. 
Solms concedes along with other authors that NREM dreams are on average more thoughtlike, 
but authors differ in terms of what this implies for the theory of dreaming, depending on their 
theoretical framework. Theorising in the field has to take account of the fact that at least 10% of 
NREM dreams are indistinguishable from REM dreams, particularly at sleep onset and during 
later portions of the night. It also has to take into account the fact that lesion studies have 
demonstrated that REM and dreaming are dissociable states. 
1.1.4. Nielsen - an attempt to bridge the two positions 
1.1.4.1. Nielsen's covert REA.,{ model 
Over and above the challenge to accepted notions regarding REM and dreaming, many authors 
now see sleep stages as far more fluid and overlapping than previously thought, with transitions 
between some sleep stages showing physiological features of both REM and NREM (Feinberg 
2000). Domhoff (2000) points out that EEG monitoring of individual subjects rarely supports the 
neat delineation of stages that have been the model of sleep physiology for some time. Nielsen 
(2000a) reports that there are 'intermediate' sleep states that occupy between 1 and 7 percent of 
sleep time in normal subjects and between 10 and 40 percent in psychiatric conditions such as 
psychosis. REM deprivation leads to an increased time spent in these intermediate states of sleep. 
A REM rebound phenomenon may also result following REM deprivation, in which there are 
repeated attempts to enter REM during NREM, as well as longer REM episodes and decreased 
time to the first REM period (REM latency). His research showed that NREM mentation was 
more similar to REM mentation when it was obtained within 5 minutes of a REM period (81 %) 
than after 10 minutes of a REM episode (3.8%). Building on these observations, Nielsen (2000a) 
argued that dreams reported in NREM might be due to what he terms 'covert' REM activity 
occurring during the NREM stage of sleep, thus returning to the REM=dreaming model via 
changes to the definition ofNREM. By covert REM, Nielsen therefore means that parts of REM 











bridge the conflicting theories by postulating these covert REM processes that occur at the 
boundaries of REMINREM transitions and at sleep onset. 
1.1.4.2. Some criticism a/the covert REM model 
Ogilvie et al (2000) have criticized the covert REM model on the basis that in sleep onset there 
are no REM periods and it is highly unlikely that REM mechanisms are responsible for any vivid 
dreaming that might occur in this stage of sleep. These authors state if you want to retain the 
REM = dreaming model, a more plausible account would be that we are not fully asleep at this 
stage, and thereby attempt to explain any mentation on the basis of waking cognition rather than 
covert REM. Cicogna and Bosinelli (2001) claim that this model does not account for dream 
reports obtained in the first stage of slow wave sleep preceding REM as intrusion of elements of 
REM physiology is least likely at this point. Feinberg (2000) points out that stage 4 sleep is the 
'polar opposite' of REM in terms of physiology and yet Stage 4 sleep has produced vivid dreams; 
a finding he argues refutes the covert REM hypothesis. Nielsen nevertheless demonstrates that 
sleep architecture is far more fluid that the models would have us believe and that transitions 
between stages are not characterized by abrupt changes in the physiological measures that 
characterize them, but that they blend into each other. Where sleep is disrupted, particul~rly when 
REM sleep is suppressed, the boundaries may become even more blurred between REM and 
NREM. 
1.1.4.3. Covert REM a return to REAl=dreaming? 
Hobson has supported Nielsen's theory of covert REM since it once again reinforces the 
REM=dreaming model. Responding to the observation that sleep stages are less neatly defined, he 
was to state "All sleep is REM sleep - more or less" (2000b, p.252). By contrast, critics of 
Nielsen's theory have effectively pointed out that Nielsen is taking a tautologous route in simply 
redefining what constitutes REM in order for it to explain the presence of dreaming during 
NREM sleep. Nielsen himself defines covert REM as 'any episode ofNREM sleep for which 
~, 
some REM processes are present but for which REM sleep cannot be scored with standard 
criteria' (Nielsen, 2000a, p. 861). This is merely a redefinition of sleep stages to suit the theory. 
Solms (2000c) points out that thus far all we can say is that some of the features which together 
collectively define REM, also sometimes occur in NREM, but that a finding of transient EEG de-











in which this physiological activity takes place. Experimental evidence for Nielsen's theory is still 
lacking (Gottesman, 2000), however this new formulation has helped force researchers to clarify 
their talk regarding aspects of sleep, dreaming and REM and generated new hypotheses which can 
be tested in support or otherwise of his theory 
1.1.5. Further theorizing on the relationship between REi\{ and dreaming 
1.1. 5.1. Time of night as a determinant of dream quality 
A number of authors have noted that dreams tend to become more vivid and lengthy as the night 
progresses, so that dreams in stage 4 late in the night have higher word counts and vivid imagery 
than those in the corresponding sleep stage earlier in the night. Feinberg (2000) showed that REM 
in later stages of the night produced longer word counts than earlier REM stages whereas length 
of time in a particular REM stage had no effect on dream word count. Domhoff (2000) showed 
that NREM reports after the third REM period of the night were more similar to REM reports 
than to earlier NREM reports on a range of Hall and Van de Castle's content indicators. This 
finding was noted by Herman et a1. (1978) to be a possible confounding factor obscuring or 
exaggerating differences in REM vs. NREM dreams, since researchers often lump together the 
REM and the NREM periods, for example comparing a dream from Stage 4 NREM with an early 
evening REM period. Rather than viewing this as a factor to be controlled for, time of night is 
now taking a more central role as a determinant of the quality of sleep mentation. Fosse, 
Stickgold and Hobson (2004) have recently published their findings in this regard, which support 
an early vs. late stage of night dichotomy as highly significant in determining the quality of sleep 
mentation. In this study, a distinction is made between 'directed thoughts' and 'hallucinations' in 
order to categorise different types of dream mentation. Their findings were that while in the initial 
stages of sleep, directed thoughts make up the majority ofNREM mentation and hallucinations 
are the preserve of REM sleep, but as the night progressed, the presence of hallucinations in 
NREM sleep increased while directed thoughts decreased, and in REM the presence of directed 
thoughts remained low, while the presence of hallucinations increased. Hallucinations remained 
more common overall in REM as expected. Importantly, it was not possible to statistically 
distinguish the mentation of early night REM with late night NREM sleep mentation in terms of 
the amount of either directed thinking or of hallucinations. The fact that early vs. late stage of 
night was a better predictor of the quality of sleep mentation than REM vs. NREM clearly has 











1.1.5.2. The role of cerebral activation 
Pagel (2000) has stated that the dream research literature has shown that there are better 
correlations between dreaming and 'cerebral activation' than with dreaming and REM. As early 
as 1970 Zimmerman reported that different auditory awakening thresholds (which he used to 
define light vs. deep sleepers) were predictors ofNREM dreaming. Following NREM laboratory 
awakenings, light sleepers reported dreaming 71 % of the time, vs. the deep sleepers who reported 
dreaming after only 21 % ofNRE:\1 awakenings. Zimmerman also found higher awakening 
thresholds in stages 3 and 4 than in stage 2 and REM sleep, and also higher awakening thresholds 
earlier in the night than later in the night. These findings converge to indicate that it is the depth 
of sleep as measured by awakening threshold that is predictive of dreaming. Also of significance 
was that the light-sleepers' NREM mentation was described as more dreamlike than that of the 
deep sleepers in his study, and in addition, within the light sleeper group there was no significant 
difference in the 'dreamlike' quality ofNREM mentation as compared with REM mentation, 
which is contrasted with differences of between p=O.2 and p=0.002 that were recorded for deep 
sleepers. The significance of these findings was such that Zimmerman concluded that it was 
probable that heightened cerebral arousal, and not sleep stage is the physiological substrate of 
dreaming. Yet the REM dreaming paradigm persisted into the 21 SI century in the face of such a 
highly competitive model. The cerebral activation model of dreaming is consistent with Nielsen's 
observation that there are 'features' of REM that occur in NREM. These features are indicative of 
this activation, which happens to be more characteristic of REM than ofNREM. An activation 
component has always been part of Hobson's theoretical model, though it does not appear to have 
occupied as central a position as the REMlNREM dichotomy. Both general cerebral activation 
and time of night have now been shown to be better predictors of the quality of dream mentation. 
Kahan (2000) argues that if differences in REM vs NREM dreaming boil down to a question of 
quantitative differences, then a one-generator model would suffice. However if qualitative 
differences do exist, she argues we do need a two-generator model, one for REM and another for 
NREM. Notwithstanding the fact that Kahan (2000) believes these differences to be quantitative 
in nature, it does not follow that qualitative differences necessarily imply different mechanisms. 
There are clearly competing theoretical approaches to a two-generator model for the presence of 











ability producing differences in dream reporting ability rather than dream, the role of cerebral 
activation, time of night, and the multitransmitter theories of Gottesmann (2001) and Perry and 
Piggot (2000), which would place these qualitative differences on a continuum corresponding 
with as-yet- unknown levels of the different neurotransmitters involved in sleep and dreaming. 
1.1. 6. Serotonergics -further evidence against the RElvi=dreaming paradigm? 
The fact that there are still attempts to redefine REM sleep in an effort to reconcile the existence 
ofNREM dreams with the predominant theory shows that there is still controversy regarding the 
extent to which REM sleep and dreaming are related, what constitutes REM, as well as what 
constitutes dreaming. Given the substantial co-occurrence of narrative type dreaming and REM 
sleep it would be unexpected to encounter a substance that suppresses REM while increasing 
REM-like dreaming; such a finding would clearly support claims that REM sleep and dleaming 
are less interdependent than is strill supposed by many. Assuming such qualitative differences 
between REM and NREM dreams do exist, one would be unlikely to characterize the vivid and 
intense dreams anecdotally described by SSRI users as typical NREM dreams. Pace-Schott et al. 
(2001) were therefore correct in assessing this finding as unexpected, leading them to postulate 
the possibility of REM rebound as the result of disturbed sleep architecture in SSRI patients 
characterized by suppression of REM sleep. Hobson et al (2000b, p. 1029) described the finding 
of increases in dream intensity with SSRI use as "consistent with the notion of cholinergic 
rebound". There is currently no empirical evidence for this. Also of importance, Perry & Perry 
(1995) have shown that defective cholinergic transmission rather than an increase in cholinergic 
activity has for some time been associated with visual hallucinations, both in the attenuated 
cholinergic transmission of Levvy body disease, as well as in a range of recreational and 
prescription substances with anticholinergic properties, most notably those containing 
scopolamine and atropine. The following section will explore the evidence for reports of 
increased dream frequency with antidepressant usage. 
1.2. Neurotransmitters involved in sleep and dreaming 
The neurotransmitters most studied with respect to sleep and dreaming are serotonin, 
acetylcholine, noradrenaline, and dopamine. According to Hobson et al (2000a) , in REM sleep 
forebrain acetylcholine is increased, and serotonin and noradrenaline decreased; in NREM the 











inhibits cholinergic activity, an effect that is believed to block or delay REM sleep which is 
cholinergically driven. Reciprocally, changes in acetylcholine immediately lead to changes in the 
levels of dopamine, serotonin and noradrenalin (Thase, 1998). In sleep, aminergic weakness 
necessarily implies cholinergic strength. The mutual exclusivity of high acetylcholine with 
(relatively) high serotonin and noradrenalin only applies to the sleep state however - in waking it 
is possible to have high release of all 3 neurotransmitters simultaneously (Gottesman, 2000). Of 
all the amines, it is thought that only dopaminergic neurons continue to fire at waking levels 
during REM, though as mentioned, new evidence points to a more differentiated role for forebrain 
dopamine across the various sleep wake states (Lena et aI, 2004). Hobson et a1. (2000a) note that 
more recent research also points to the possible involvement of neuropeptides such as glycine and 
adenosine, as well as suggesting a role for glutamate, GABA, and other substances in modulating 
REM sleep. 
Since the REM-NREM cycle is thought to be characterized by changes in the neurotransmitters 
serotonin, noradrenaline and acetylcholine, drugs that cause alterations in levels of these 
neurotransmitters would be expected to cause alterations in sleep physiology whether directly or 
indirectly, and, depending on one's theoretical viewpoint, on dreaming as well. It will therefore 
be instructive to examine the available literature on drugs that cause changes in any of these 
neurotransmitters, and which are known to alter REM-NREM sleep physiology, dreaming or 
both. 
1.3. Antidepressants and their effects on sleep and dreaming 
1. 3.1. The SSRI's -first line treatment in depression 
The Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI's) are the drug therapy of choice for the 
treatment of depression, replacing the older tricyclics and monoamine oxidase inhibitors 
(MOAI's) due to a far lower incidence of unwanted side effects (De Vane, 1992). The SSRI's are 
also simpler to administer relative to the older drugs and boast an improved safety profile; the 
MOAI's have fallen into some disfavour due to the risk of hypertensive crises leading to possible 
brain haemorrhage, a risk which necessitated onerous dietary restrictions. The SSRI's are less 
toxic in overdose than both older classes of drug and are safer in use with renal-impaired patients 











improved side effect tolerability has also meant that fewer patients are inclined to drop out of 
treatment prior to experiencing the therapeutic benefits of the drugs (Boyer & Feighner, 1998). 
1. 3. 2. Other uses of SSRJ's 
Though initially designed as antidepressants, it was soon noted that SSRl's were also effective in 
treating anxiety symptoms in depressed patients, a finding that led to the hope that these drugs 
might also prove useful in the treatment of anxiety disorders such as panic disorder and social 
phobia (Boyer & Feighner, 1998). The SSRl's have been argued to be more effective at treating 
certain anxiety disorders such as panic disorder than were the older drugs and are now commonly 
prescribed as a first line of treatment for a range of anxiety disorders, including PTSD, OeD, 
panic, social phobia, and generalized anxiety disorder (Ballenger, 1998; Kaplan and Saddock, 
2003). In addition, the SSRl's are often prescribed for eating disorders, though according to 
Kaplan and Saddock (2003, p.745), no medication has so far provided 'definitive improvement of 
the core symptoms of anorexia nervosa'. 
1. 3. 3. lvfechanisms of serotonergic antidepressants 
The discovery of the link between increased serotonin and relief of depression was serendipitous, 
like many other psychopharmalogical discoveries, and for this reason, less is known about the 
mechanics of the alleviation of depression and anxiety symptoms than might be expected 
(Gorman, 2000). For example, it is still not understood why many patients do not experience 
alleviation of symptoms until around four weeks after commencement of antidepressant regimes, 
usually some days or even weeks after steady state plasma levels of brain serotonin have been 
reached (Snyder, 1986; Hobson, 2001). Gaillard, Nicholson & Pascoe (1994) suggest that the 
therapeutic benefit of antidepressants may even be due to alterations in mechanisms other than 
serotonergic ones as suggested by an observed increased in the number of GAB A receptors with 
antidepressant use. All three major classes of antidepressants (monoamine oxidase inhibitors, 
tricyclics and SSRl's) are designed to increase serotonin levels, though the mechanisms vary. The 
MOAI's increase serotonin levels through inhibiting the creation of the enzyme that degrades 
excess synaptic serotonin. The tricyclics act through inhibition of the reuptake of noradrenalin 
and serotonin by the presynaptic neuron. SSRl's act by selectively limiting only the reuptake of 
serotonin by the presynaptic neuron, thus leaving more of the neurotransmitter available at the 











1.3.-1. Etlecls o/antidepressants on sleep and dreaming 
Roth. Kramer and Salis (1979) performed a review of the available literature on sleep and 
dreaming at a time when only the MOAI's and tricyclics were available for the treatment of 
anxiety and depression. Virtually all the antidepressants developed to date have some effect on 
sleep physiology. either reducing the amount of REM sleep or the time taken to reach the first 
REM period. and in fewer cases, altering other sleep stages. (REM latency refers to the time taken 
to the first REM period. and REM density refers to the number of eye movements per unit time). 
These effects may be relatively short lived or persist for the duration of the antidepressant 
therapy. In some instances REM rebound occurs on discontinuation. as a result of prolonged 
deprivation of REM sleep. Of the research considered 'minimally adequate' methodologically in 
the Roth et al. (1979) review, none were available for review on the monoamine oxidase 
inhibitors (MOAI's) with regard to either sleep or dreaming, although Nicholson et al (1994) 
report reduced REM sleep with monoamine therapy, a phenomenon which Jacobs (1977) also 
observed does not correct itself with prolonged administration and in which no REM rebound \-"as 
observed. A tricyclic antidepressant. amitriptyline. was show'n in four studies to cause an initial 
increased sleep time and increased stage 3 sleep. REM sleep was found to be significantly 
reduced. On discontinuation of the drug, a REM-rebound phenomenon occurred, in which 
subsequent night's sleep showed increased time in REM sleep. Two studies looked at dreams and 
imipramine (another tricyclic drug), one in normal subjects. which found reduction in 'REM-
Recall dreams' (note that subjects dream recall was only tested in REM, since REM and dreaming 
were still considered to be uncontroversially isomorphic at that time). Another study using seven 
depressed patients showed no difference in frequency of dreaming but an increase in the hostility 
and anxiety content of dreams after a week on imipramine. In their review Kramer et al. (1979) 
deplored the lack of systematic work on the study of drug efTects on dreaming. stating that not 
even one drug had been examined in any depth. Despite anecdotal evidence to the eiTect that the 
SSRI"s sometimes cause dramatic changes in dreaming characteristics, today the situation with 












1.3.4.1. The impact ojSSRJ's on sleep and dreaming. 
As would be expected given their effect on serotonin levels, the SSRI's strongly suppres~ REM 
sleep, although REM is not completely eliminated. Administration of the SSRI's would also be 
expected to reduce reports of dreaming given the strong co-occurrence of REM sleep and 
dreaming. However clinical anecdotes as well as a small number of published studies have 
consistently shown increases in certain dreaming characteristics in patients taking SSRI's, 
particularly with regard to frequency, vividness and intensity, with SSRI users often reporting that 
it feels like they dream all night long (Pace-Schott et aI, 2001, Hobson, 2001). Research evidence 
has been mostly restricted to case studies, with limited supporting evidence from clinical trials, 
which incidentally list abnormal or increased dreaming amongst various other side effects. There 
is one experimental study in the literature with the specific aim of investigating the relationship 
between the SSRI's and altered dreaming. This study, although small, found significant !l1CreaSes 
in dream intensity. The following section will take a look at the case report and clinical trial data 
before examining the experimental study in more detail. 
1.3.4.2. The case report data 
Markowitz (1991) discusses 4 case reports in which vivid and intense dreaming was reported with 
fluoxetine treatment in dysthymic patients. In all four cases the sudden increase in vivid dreaming 
preceded therapeutic benefit. One patient recorded 'technicolor dreams', where her pre-
medication dreams were unremarkable. All reported more vivid and realistic-feeling dreams, 
more memorable and intense though with unchanged form or content In his own practice, 
Markowitz asked a further 18 patients who had switched from tricyclics to fluoxetine whether 
they recalled more dreams. Only two reported increased recall under fluoxetine (11 percent of the 
sample). It is not clear whether any of the four more detailed cases had previously been on other 
antidepressant medication. A study by Armitage, Rochlen, Fitch, Trivedi, and Rush (1995) into 
dream reports in depressed patients included patients that were taking either fluoxetine or 
nefazodone. Since these antidepressants have quite different effects on sleep architecture 
(nefazodone does not suppress REM whereas fluoxetine does [Thase, 1998]) the sample as a 
whole cannot be viewed as a homogenous group for our purposes. Nevertheless Armitage noted 
that whereas the sample as a whole showed a decrease in dream recall, those on fluoxetine 











nefazodone showed a decrease in dream recall. Lepkifer, Damon, Iancu, Ziv and Kotler (1995) 
report four cases in which the administration of fluoxetine in patients coincided with frequent 
nightmares, which stopped with cessation of treatment. None of the patients had reported 
nightmares prior to treatment. Three of the patients were diagnosed with a major depressive 
episode, and one patient was diagnosed with OCD. The patients with major depressive episode 
were placed on 20mg fluoxetine/day and the patient with OCD on 40mg/day. In addition to the 
nightmares, the patient with OCD experienced hypnopompic phenomena (confusion of dreaming 
with reality on emerging from sleep) under fluoxetine, which Hobson (2001) argues is a not-
infrequent consequence of long-term use of fluoxetine. Hobson ascribes this to frequent 
awakenings, suggesting that the SSRl's actually break down the boundaries between REM and 
NREM sleep. Lepkifer et aL (1995) propose that fluoxetine may cause an imbalance between 
dopamine and serotonin levels leading to a possible hypersensitivity of dopaminergic receptors, 
which in turn leads to heightened dopaminergic activity and hence more vivid dreams. The latter 
theory ties in with Gottesman's (2001) monoaminergic disinhibition hypothesis and Perry and 
Piggott's (2000) multitransmitter theory discussed above. 
1.3.4.3. Clinical trials impact ojSSRJ's on dreaming and sleep architecture 
In a Scandinavian clinical trial, citalopram was administered in order to test its effectiveness in 
treating Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The drug was administered over a 24-week 
period, and as an incidental side effect, six percent of the 29 participants reported increased 
dreaming (Koponen, Lepola, Leinonen, Penttinen & Turtonen, 1997). Despite the fact that such 
side effects are only reported in a minority of patients, this symptom, together with decreased 
sleep were listed among the 'most commonly experienced adverse events' (p343) along with 
nausea and vomiting, and notably, more frequently reported than diminished sexual interest and 
performance, a well-documented side effect of SSRI use (Kaplan & Saddock, 2003). It is not 
clear whether patients were specifically asked about increased dreaming or whether this 'Vas 
spontaneously reported. This is important, since many patients would not attach significance to 
changes in dreaming as being related to the medication and might fail to report such changes. One 
presumes 'increased dreaming' indicates an increase in dream frequency rather than length or 
intensity, but cannot be certain that this is the case. The authors note that the increase in dreaming 
persisted throughout the 24-week study period. A study by Ekselius, von Knorring and Eberhard 











activity' in 4.5 % of patients on sertraline and 5.5% of patients treated with citalopram, both 
statistically significant, though sample sizes were large. 400 patients with major depression were 
randomly assigned to the two groups, of whom 308 completed the 24-week study. Again it is not 
clear whether reports of increased dream activity was spontaneously volunteered or elicited 
through specific questioning. That increased dreaming is a well accepted phenomenon with SSRI 
use is evidenced by its inclusion in the latest edition of Kaplan and Saddock (2003), a psychiatric 
reference text, who note that 'a minority of persons taking SSRI's report recalling extremely vivid 
dreams or nightmares' (p.l 099). In addition Markowitz (1991) noted that the package insert for 
fluoxetine lists 'abnormal' dreams under the heading 'frequent adverse effects', It would seem 
that abnormal or increased dreaming is a fairly well documented side-effect of treatment with 
SSRI's in a minority of patients, though the clinical trials that have led to this conclusion have not 
been conducted with the purpose of exploring this relationship but rather to document the side 
effect profile of the various drugs. For this reason it is not entirely clear which qualitative aspects 
of the dreams of these patients changed. 
In terms of the impact of SSRI's on sleep architecture, Saletu, Frey and Krupka (1991) found in 
an experiment with 18 volunteers that although REM was significantly decreased under 
fluoxetine and paroxetine, subjectively sleep quality was reported as unchanged. Lepkifer et al 
(1995) also argue that although fluoxetine increases REM latency, it does not alter REM density 
or the total number of hours slept. By contrast Koponen et al (1997) did find a decrease in overall 
sleep time in their study with citalopram, 
1.3.4.4. Experimental data - The Pace-Schott study 
A recent study by Pace-Schott, Gersh, Silvestri, Stickgold, Salzman and Hobson (2001) provides 
the only experimental evidence to date with the express purpose of exploring the phenomenon of 
SSRI-related dream alteration. Their study comprised 14 normal, paid volunteers and involved 31 
days of continuous assessment. The first 7 days were treated as drug-free baseline; during the next 
19 the subjects were administered either paroxetine (7 subjects) or fluvoxamine (7 subjects). Both 
drugs have similar half-lives (the half life of a drug is the time it takes for the blood level of a 
drug to fall to 50% of its peak). The final 5 days of the study entailed a withdrawal period. REM 
sleep measures were taken using polysomnography, and subjects were interviewed regarding 











such as how many known characters vs. strangers were present, and the bizarreness rating of the 
dream. The research team found decreased self report measures of dream frequency but increased 
word count and emotional intensity between baseline and steady state, which is based on 
approximately 5 half-lives of the drug (De Vane, 1999). Increases in visual vividness with 
treatment were described as a trend, though not statistically significant; power calculations 
showed an effect size of 0.65. For the most part their findings are supportive of the anecdotal and 
case study evidence Vvith regard to qualitative features of the dream experience such as intensity 
and visual vividness, though clinical reports of increased dream frequency were not upheld by the 
data. 
As this was intended as a pilot study, there are some limits with regard to the scope of conclusions 
that can be drawn, in that the sample was small, and the subjects were only on the drugs for a total 
of 19 days, a timeframe that would not be considered therapeutic (although one that makes sense 
in the context of the time limits of the study, which involved daily monitoring of volunteers 
taking psychiatric medication). As it turns out, most case reports indicate increased dreaming 
prior to therapeutic result, and in fact some even suggest that such side effects may provide 
indication of the likelihood of therapeutic success with the medication (Markowitz, 1991, 
Nicholson, Bradley, Pascoe, 1994), nevertheless for completeness one would ideally like to 
delineate all the phases as they are experienced by patients. (In recent correspondence with Pace-
Schott, he has stated that his current research is focused on the longer term effects of SSRl's on 
dreaming, apparently with quite marked effects on dream intensity (private correspondence, 
2003)). 
Hobson (2001), possibly commenting on the same data, also noted an increase in, rather than a 
leveling off of abnormal dream content and abnormal sleep architecture with prolonged use of 
fluoxetine. Hobson also argues that SSRl users spend more time in light sleep near waking levels, 
and suggests that they dream more and are aware of their dreams more. Hobson's explanation for 
this is that they awaken more often (Hobson, 2001). Both Hobson and Pace-Schott propose the 
increased intensity and vividness of dreams noted in this and in other research might be due to a 
cholinergic driven REM-rebound phenomenon precipitated by prolonged REM suppression. This 
has not been shown to occur with either the SSRl's or with the older classes of drug (it has 











does not correct itself during treatment, and also that withdrawal of tricyclic therapy leads to 
REM rebound, but there is no documented evidence of a rebound phenomenon during 
antidepressant use). However Thase (1998) states that antidepressants redistribute REM later into 
the night (he unfortunately does not state which antidepressants, nor provide a reference for this 
particular assertion). It is also of interest that paroxetine, which is used in the Pace-Schott et al 
(2001) study, is the only SSRl with significant anticholinergic properties. The authors reported 
greater rated bizarreness of dreaming in the paroxetine group compared with the fluvoxamine 
group. Since cholinergic activity increases the propensity for entering REM, anticholinergic 
activity should further suppress REM according to the authors' theory, and consequently decrease 
vivid or intense REM-type dreaming. This finding is however consistent with reports of visual 
hallucinations associated with use of anticholinergic drugs discussed above (Perry & Perry, 
1995). 
The fact that there was no placebo group in this study makes it difficult to draw conclusions 
regarding intervention \vith SSRI's in general (as opposed to intervention per se), a limitation 
recognized by the authors. It has long been reported that subjects can be trained to remember 
dreams, and that once attention is focused on the importance of dream recall, subjects tend to 
report more dreams, as shown in laboratory dream series (Strauch & Meier, 1966) thus while a 
pre-post design has strong merits, inclusion of a control group would have diminished concerns 
regarding possible experimenter effect. This study is important however in that it is the only 
experimental study to date to examine the effects of SSRI's on dreaming. The fact that increases 
in certain measures of intensity were found in their pilot study thus calls for confirmation through 
replication. 
1.4. Dream Research - problems al1d pitfalls 
1.4.1. Determinants of Dream recall 
In a 1968 study by Meier, Ruff and Ziegler, it was reported that around 80 of REM awakenings in 
the laboratory would yield a dream report in normal subjects, though there are large individual 
differences. Most dreams obtained during laboratory testing through middle of night awakenings 
would otherwise have been forgotten in the morning since most people remember less than one 
per cent of their dreams (Domhoff, 2003). Dreams rated as intense are the most likely of these 











Dreams rated as having higher intensity tended to occur during the earlier periods of sleep, and 
shorter dreams occurred from the last period of sleep. Meier et al. (1968) concluded from this that 
'recency, intensity and amount of material interact to influence the amount of morning recall of 
dreams recorded during the night.' (p.555.) Cohen (1979) found that along with emotionality and 
vividness, salience of the dream for the individual also affected recall. Hartmann (2000) argues 
that it is no less difficult recalling one's daydreams than recalling the average dream. To recall 
what one was thinking on the way to work this morning may be fairly difficult for example, since 
it is usually of little consequence. The net result is that dreams spontaneously recalled are unlikely 
to be representative of dream life on average. 
1.4.2. Laboratory Dreams 
Much argument has been generated regarding the validity of laboratory dreams, with allegations 
of experimenter effect, laboratory fatigue, the construction of the dream experience through focus 
on it, and motivational problems on the part of subjects (Hobson et al., 2000a). While not 
elaborating this area of debate in too great detail, it should be noted that without laboratory dream 
series, the amount of data at our disposal would be significantly poorer. For example it is only in 
the laboratory that frequent awakenings from physiologically verifiable sleep stages can reveal 
the amount of dreams subjects are able to report in contrast with what is retained after normal 
morning awakenings. And it is only in the laboratory that one is likely to encounter the more 
mundane thought-like dreams that might otherwise have been forgotten. Nevertheless laboratory 
studies, while contributing a more representative sample of dreams, remain expensive and time 
consuming and thus beyond the scope of some researchers. 
1.4,3. High vs. Low dream recallers 
Because of large individual differences in the ability to recall dreams, 'low dream recallers' are 
frequently excluded from dream studies, with the result that participants in dream research tend to 
be high recallers. Nielsen (2000) found differences in the rates of REM vs. NREM dreams in high 
recallers vs. low recallers, which may account for some differences in the findings where studies 











1.4.4. The problem of correspondence 
Possibly the most intractable methodological problem in dream research is the fact that the dream 
report is not the dream itself; LaBerge (2000) points out that the word 'dream' is repeatedly 
substituted for dream report, by both Hobson and Solms. Moreover the event (the dream) occurs 
in one mental state while the dream report is obtained in another, (waking) state (Kramer, 2000); 
and as Hobson et al. (2000a) point out, a unimodal vehicle is used to describe a multimodal 
experience. Memory is 'a constructive rather than a reproductive enterprise' according to Kramer 
(2000, p.960) and Feinberg (2000) goes so far as to suggest that dreams might be constructed 
during the process of awakening as memory systems which have been disabled or disconnected 
during sleep, switch back on. Domhoff (2003) counters the latter concern by citing examples of 
sleeptalking subjects in whom the post-awakening report reflects the sleeptalking narrative. 
Failure to obtain dream reports could be due to a lack of skill in pulling together a narrative and 
communicating it, which in tum may be due to poor language skills, poor organizational skills or 
poor education. Thus one cannot assume for example that dream report length gives an indication 
of dream length, or that reported complexity is faithfully communicated in the report (Schredl, 
2000). 
1.4.5. Defining the dream 
Another important, but theoretically sunnountable methodological difficulty facing dream 
researchers is the fact that there is no standard definition of what constitutes a dream. 
Aristotle defined dreaming as 'the mental activity of the sleeper insofar as he is asleep' (As 
quoted in Pagel [2000, p.985]). This broad (and intuitive) definition would certainly be viewed as 
too inclusive by those wishing to postulate a separate mechanism for mentation occurring outside 
of REM sleep, hence Hobson and Nielsen's more exclusionary criteria. Nielsen (2000a) provides 
a definition of dreaming (which most authors don't) but his definition might be considered 
restrictive, including only those dreams that other researchers consider 'apex' dreaming - those 
that exhibit elements of bizarreness, delusional thinking and hyperemotionality. The benefits of 
providing a definition are therefore outweighed by the fact that the definition almost always 
serves to provide support for the theory, and the criteria used to define what does or does not 
qualify as a dream inevitably affect the results (Kramer, 2000; Kahan, 2000), a point which 











In early laboratory series it became clear to participants what researchers deemed worthy of 
'dream' status and what were considered thoughts during sleep, thus influencing what they chose 
to report on awakening (Herman et aI, 1978). Some studies had binary-type ratings for dreams as 
either dreams or not-dreams and others had sliding scales according to which reports were graded 
as more or less dreamlike (Herman et aI, 1978). Since the debate regarding REM vs. NREM 
dreams has from the start been focused on qualitative differences between sleep mentation 
obtained from these two states, it is crucial that researchers make clear from the outset their 
criteria for inclusion and exclusion. Awareness of this problem surfaced early in the NREM 
dreaming debate as it resulted in a string of studies in the 1970's being apparently unable to 
replicate one another's findings (Herman, Ellman & Roffwarg, 1978). Early researchers tended to 
rely on a common intuitive understanding of what we mean by dreaming, however as soon as 
researchers stated their criteria it became clear that this was not the case. Researchers in the field 
have thus tended to evaluate their results against an ever-changing definition of what constitutes a 
dream. Nielsen (2000b) argues for a theory-free definition of dreaming, or at least a strategy to 
address the disagreement in this area in order to overcome confusion. 
1.4.6. Quality o/the research evidence 
Schredl, Funkhouser, Cornu, Hirsbrunner & Bahro (2001 b) argue that much of the extant dream 
research is methodologically unsound with questionnaires poorly assessed for reliability prior to 
administration. In the Schredl et al. (2001 b) study, word count was found to be stable over time 
but most dream content variables were not, and therefore were not considered stable 
characteristics. Antrobus (1995) points out that findings regarding dreaming and sleep stages in 
animals have been (erroneously) generalized to humans. Much of the early 'dream' research was 
conducted on animals, from whom no dream reports were elicited; the assumption was that REM 
sleep and dreaming are synonymous, therefore conclusions regarding REM sleep were 
extrapolated to conclusions regarding dreaming 
If researchers are to investigate dreaming it is not possible to reduce the enterprise to a search for 
physiological variables, since there is no agreement on the physiological correlates of the 
dreaming process. The phenomenological data frequently point to logical areas of investigation, 
and should therefore not be disregarded. For example, the fact that dreams over a night seem from 











limbic system in generating content rather than a random access of one's memory banks (Kramer, 
2000). We need the subjective self-reports of dream experience to generate the theories that may 
then be sUbjected to empirical support through PET scanning, lesion studies or whatever new 
technology we may apply to the problem. 
1.5. The importance of cofltinuing with dream research 
Investigations into both the intended and unintended effects of certain medications frequently 
provide information regarding brain functions. Prior to the introduction of the benzodiazepines for 
the treatment of anxiety for example, it was assumed that the inevitable result of tranquilizing 
drugs such as the barbiturates, was sedation. With the advent of the benzodiazepines it was 
discovered that anxiolytics need not necessarily cause'sedation, and the previously assumed 
connection between brain mechanisms sustaining alertness and those causing anxiety was 
questioned (Snyder, 1986). Therefore if drugs such as the SSRI's have the effect of causing 
abnormally vivid and intense dreaming contrary to expectations that are consistent with current 
sleep and dream architecture theory, such a finding might add another piece to the puzzle of sleep 
and dream theory. A link between increased frequency or intensity of dreaming and SSRI therapy 
posits another argument against the simple association of dreaming and REM and requires 
explanation. 
In an article entitled 'Neurological dreaming', Oliver Sacks (1991) talks about dreaming as a 
barometer of neurological health and disease. Sacks describes how neurological disease may alter 
dreaming either qualitatively or quantitatively, a fact which he claims is often overlooked by 
clinicians and one that could be used in diagnosis. In this article he describes one account of vivid 
dreaming as migraine aura, and noted in another case that visual imagery vanished from the 
dreams of an Alzheimer's patient. In his studies with Parkinson's patients he found that the first 
signs of successful response with L-Dopa are vivid dreams, and in one patient, the first signs of 
impending movement difficulty occurred in his dreams. Solms (1997, p.l) points out that 'many 
neurological patients complained of specific changes in their dreams, the onset of which they 
dated to the beginning of their illness', for example, with hydrocephalus, a condition in which 
cessation of dreaming is typical, patient reports of cessation or return of dreaming may be helpful 
in monitoring the progress of the disease, since successful treatment with shunting may often 











opposed to REM sleep) are an under-researched function, and one which according to Solms 
(2003, personal communication), has great theoretical relevance for our understanding of the 
brain mechanisms underlying the positive symptoms of some psychoses. A clearer understanding 
of the mechanisms and neurotransmitters involved in dreaming may thus prove to be invaluable, 
and perhaps a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of action of medications such as the 













This study is cross-sectional in design, comparing specific dream characteristics from two groups 
of subjects, one group receiving therapy with SSRI's and a comparable group receiving no 
pharmacotherapy. Participants were recruited at one of two centers, the first being the outpatient 
psychiatric department of the state teaching hospital facility associated with the university of 
Cape To\\'u, (Groote Schuur) and the other being the anxiety disorders unit affiliated with 
Stellenbosch University. Both universities ethical review boards gave ethical approval. All 
participants gave written informed consent Interviews took place between June 2003 and May 
2004. It was decided to use psychiatric patients rather than normal volunteers due to both 
financial and ethical constraints associated with clinical trial research. In addition this choice of 
sample afforded the opportunity to study patients whose duration of SSRI therapy alreadj 
extended into what would be considered a therapeutic timeframe, thus providing the possibility of 
complementing the Pace-Schott et al (2001) findings, in which 19 days of SSRI therapy was 
administered. A disadvantage of this population is that benzodiazepines are frequently 
concurrently prescribed; possible implications of this will be discussed in more detail below. 
Participants spoke either English or Afrikaans. Although there are 11 official languages in South 
Africa, the interview protocol was restricted to these two languages for the sake of practicality. 
Afrikaans is the language most spoken in the Western Cape, so this did not prove restrictive. 
Since both facilities are state funded to a varying degree, the low to middle socioeconomic groups 
are over represented, with tertiary education the exception rather than the rule. Accordi~g to 
Kramer and Roth (1979) socioeconomic class has a small effect on dream content. 
Responses from a total of 54 participants were obtained, and of these it was necessary to exclude 
fourteen responses. These fourteen exclusions resulted in a total of 40 participants, 20 in each 
group. Eight of the exclusions were due to discontinuation of SSRI therapy, in most cases for 
placement on alternative treatment regimes. A further six were excluded since it became apparent 
that their Axis I diagnosis could result in a potential study confound due to their documented 











2.1.1. The relationship between psychiatric disorders and dream abnormalities 
With patients in whom the diagnostic criteria for their psychiatric disorder include abnormal 
dreaming it would be reasonable to expect spontaneous alteration in dreaming in keeping with 
other treatment benefits where SSRI treatment is successful. Changes in dream characteristics 
have indeed been documented in association with successful treatment for certain psychiatric 
conditions (Kirschner, 1999; Ross, 1989). This could create a potential confound for this study. 
Therefore, this next section takes a look at the range of disorders for which SSRI's are commonly 
prescribed, with a view to identifying those for which there are no reported abnormalities in sleep 
or dreaming characteristics for inclusion in this study. 
2.1.1.1. The relationship between depression and dream characteristics 
Sleep anomalies have been reported in a majority of people with depression. Some researchers 
place this incidence at more than 90% of depressed patients (Lepkifer, Damon, Iancu, Ziv & 
Kotler, 1995). Insomnia, hypersomnia, shorter REM latency, early morning awakenings, lack of 
dreaming and nightmares are some of the conditions reported and included as DSMIV diagnostic 
criteria for depression (Thase, 1998; Nicholson, Bradley & Pascoe, 1994). A study by Armitage, 
Rochlen, Fitch, Trivedi, and Rush (1995) found significantly lower dream reports amongst 
depressed patients than is the norm. For admission to the study. patients had to score 17 or more 
on the Hamilton depression scale. Only 21 of 82 patients recalled any dreams at all during the 
study. Those that did dream gave dream reports, which she described as 'bland, short and devoid 
of any strong emotional content' (Armitage et aI, 1995. p.190). In addition, cognitive abilities 
including memory and concentration may be impaired during a depressive episode (Kaplan & 
Saddock, 2003). Both the incidence of dreaming and the memory of these dreams are thus likely 
to be suppressed during a depressive episode. The introduction of depression-relieving treatment, 
whether therapy or medication, could therefore be expected to lead to a 'spontaneous' 
improvement in reported dreaming. Kirschner (1999) documented changes in dream content in a 
depressed patient taking Sertraline, in which he describes her post-medication dreams as closer to 
norms in terms of aggressive and friendly themes, though he does not explore alterations in dream 
frequency. Due to the well-established relationship between depression and suppressed dreaming, 
patients with an Axis I diagnosis of depression were excluded from the study as a potential 











2.1.1.2. Relation between anxiety disorders and dream characteristics 
In 1979 Kramer and Roth performed a review of the literature regarding dreaming in relation to 
psychopathology, and found a preponderance of case reports, which were mostly descriptive and 
without reference to norms. Their review covered dreams in schizophrenic, depressed, alcoholic, 
mentally retarded and brain damaged patients. Most of the studies that were experimental did not 
control for the presence of medication, and the basis on which diagnosis was made was in many 
cases not stated. Despite a comprehensive review, they reported no data on the relationship 
between dreaming and anxiety or eating disorders, with the studies reviewed having focused on 
psychosis and depression. There does appear to be one study that did look at anxiety and 
dreaming that is discussed below (Desroches & Kaiman, 1966), this was possibly excluded for 
methodological reasons. Many of the older studies that have attempted to link dreaming 
characteristics with psychiatric disorders failed to adequately operationalise either the 
independent or dependent variables. Ross et al (1989) point out that it is often not stated whether 
patients are or are not taking psychotropic medication, or whether they suffer from additional co-
morbid psychiatric or other medical complaints. It is often quoted that anxiety is related to an 
increase in frightening dreams, but a search of the literature revealed no recent research on the 
topic, aside from PTSD. Instead this assertion is made 'with reference to older studies such as the 
Desroches and Kaiman (1962) correlational study in which no DSM (or other accepted) criteria 
for anxiety are used. In this study an intercorrelation matrix is used to show links between certain 
indicators of anxiety, such as self-report on how often the subject got up in the night to urinate or 
smoke, or how often in the last week the subject felt jumpy, and how many times during the last 
week the subject experienced stomach cramps. In this study 30 different intercorrelations were 
done: of these only 4 were significant; 3 'different' variables correlated positively with the 
variable 'recall of dreams'; these were 'number of times up last night', 'number of times up at 
night to urinate' and 'number of times up last night to smoke'. No attempted link was made 
between frightening dream and traumatic experience, as we do now with PTSD despite the fact 
that it appears that half the subjects in this study were resident at the war veterans administration 
center in Tennessee. The disorders encompassed under the rubric of anxiety disorders include 
very heterogenous syndromes, particularly from the point of view of their relationship with sleep 
and dreaming disorders. As it is hoped to show, of the disorders classified as anxiety disorders, 












2.1.1.3. oeD and sleep/dreaming changes 
REM latency was shown in some studies to be reduced in OCD but other studies showed normal 
RE:\11atency (Benca, Obermeyer, Thisted & Gillin, 1992). According to a more recent survey by 
Robinson, Walsleben, Pollack & Lerner (1998) the small database of existing research show 
neither significant sLeep nor dreaming anomalies in OCD. In their own study Robinson tt al. 
(1998) found no significant differences in sleep EEG polysomnography between OCD and 
normal volunteers. The relationship between OCD and abnormal dreaming was investigated by 
Sauteraud, Menny, Philip, Peyre and Bonnin (2001), who found no differences between the 
dreams ofOCD and normal patients. 47 dreams were collected from the OeD and 55 from the 
control group. In a blind rating, two judges found no higher incidence in the dreams of OCD 
patients of anxiety, failure, sadness or obsessive~compulsive themes than there were in the control 
patients. These authors also comment on the problem of diagnostic imprecision in previous 
studies and chose to examine OCD patients since they felt the diagnostic criteria to be less 
variable. Depression was excluded as a co-morbid diagnosis through use of the Hamilton 
depression scale, and patients had to engage in ritual behaviour for at least 2 hours a day in order 
to qualify for inclusion. The authors were struck by the difference in waking mentation and dream 
mentation in this patient population, with no evidence of either integration of daily events or 
amongst the OCD patients of any ritual themes into their dreams. Negative themes predomina.ed 
in both groups but were in fact slightly but insignificantly higher amongst the control group. 
There were no statistics provided on whether the incidence or frequency of dreaming differed 
amongst the two groups, but given that there were 10 OCD patients and 11 controls it does not 
appear that there is a significant difference in dream recall rates (identical dream report rates 
would therefore have been 50 OCD dreams for 55 control dreams - the actual figures are 47 OCD 
dreams for 55 control dreams). 
2.1.1.4. Panic Disorder and dreaming 
Mellman and Uhde (1989) reported a decrease in the number of REM periods in patients with 
panic disorder compared with controls but no difference in the percentage of time spent overall in 
any stage of sleep compared with controls and no other abnormalities associated with the REM 
stages as assessed using EEG. A study by Free, Winget and Whitman (1993) was designed to 











more themes of both 'covert hostility' and separation anxiety in the dreams of20 DSM-III 
diagnosed panic disorder patients as compared to 20 psychiatric controls. Unfortunately no 
measure of dream frequency was obtained. The choice of psychiatric patients rather than normal 
controls also implies that there are no normative comparisons that can be made from their study 
regarding dream content. Schredl, Kronenberg, Nonell and Heuser (2001a) investigated the 
relationship between panic dison;ler as defined by DSMIV criteria, dream recall and nightmare 
frequency, and found a relationship between frequency of nocturnal panic attacks and nightmare 
frequency, but no relationship between the severity of the panic disorder and dream recall or 
nightmare frequency. 
2. 1.1.5, PTSD and dreaming 
The topic of PTSD and changes in dream mentation has been widely documented, with recurrent, 
distressing dreams of the (traumatic) event one of the diagnostic criteria for the disorder (Kaplan 
& Saddock, 2003). Ross, Ball, Sullivan and Caroff (1989) report that amongst the normal 
population, nightmares are reported in around 20 to 25 percent of people, at a rate of less than one 
per year. By contrast 68% of Vietnam veterans reported having nightmares at least once a month. 
Germain and Nielsen (2003) report a rate of 75% of reported presence of nightmares in PTSD 
patients. Dreams are described as vivid, affect laden, and disturbing. REM latency was found to 
be increased and length of REM periods shorter. Ross et al (1989) question whether these 
episodes of dream mentation should be considered real nightmares or represent a type of 
parasomnia that could be defined as the re-experiencing of the traumatic incident in sleep. 
Germain and Nielsen (2003) found differences between PTSD nightmare sufferers and 'ordinary' 
nightmare sufferers, with the PTSD nightmares occurring earlier in the night as well as an 
association with more gross body movements and more frequent nocturnal awakenings. (Of 
relevance for the REM-NREM dreaming debate, Domhoff (2003) points out that the recurring 
nightmares ofPTSD patients occur both in REM and NREM sleep). Treatment with 
antidepressants such as the monoamines and tricyclics has been shown to significantly reduce the 
number of nightmares along with the other features of PTSD (Ross, 1989). It should be clear from 
the foregoing that this subgroup would be singularly unsuitable for any investigation into the link 











At the time of writing there were unfortunately no published studies investigating links between 
Generalized anxiety disorder as defined by DSM (or other standard) criteria and dreaming. In 
addition, nothing of relevance could be found relating social phobia with dreaming changes. 
2.1.1.6. Eating disorders and dreaming 
Kaplan and Saddock (2003) did not note any disturbance in sleep or dreaming associated with 
eating disorders, however the SSRI's are unlikely to be the first line of treatment for this range of 
conditions, and for this reason patients with eating disorders were not considered to be a practical 
group for inclusion in this study. 
2.1.1.7. Co-Aforbidity in psychiatric disorders 
According to Kessler (1998) most people with anxiety disorders have other co-morbid psychiatric 
disorders, with the strongest co-morbidity relation betv.:een anxiety and depression, in particular 
between depression and generalized anxiety disorder, and between depression and panic disorder. 
Kessler (1998) argues that with the proliferation of diagnostic categories, people who might 
previously have been diagnosed with one disorder might now find themselves with multiple 
diagnoses. This poses a potential confound when using psychiatric patient samples. 
2.1.1.8. Dreaming and Psychiatric disorders - Conclusion 
There appears to be a paucity of research into the dream characteristics of various psychiatric 
disorders. which is unfortunate since it might be premature to categorically conclude that there are 
no differences in dream frequency and vividness in obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic 
disorder, social phobia and generalized anxiety disorder compared \-vith normal controls. At this 
stage, the only DSM-IV reference made regarding abnormal sleep or dreaming in anxiety 
disorders is made with reference to PTSD (Kaplan & Saddock, 2003). The fact that the evidence 
leans in favor of the null hypothesis makes this group a better choice than depressed patients 
rather than a perfect choice. The presence of abnormal dreams as one of the diagnostic criteria for 
PTSD makes this an obvious exclusion from the anxiety disorder group. Patients on SSRI's for 
generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, oeD and social phobia were therefore considered 
suitable candidates for this study, bearing in mind the potentially confounding factor of a high co-
morbidity of depression with many anxiety disorders. The Axis I diagnosis has been used, as 











Table 1: Spread of anxiety disorders included 
Axis I SSRI No meds 
Generalised anxiety disorder 7 10 
Panic disorder 5 6 
oeD 6 3 
Social Phobia 2 1 
2.1.2. Other sample characteristics 
For the group taking SSRI's, the duration of therapy varied from 1 month to 60 months with a 
mean of 17 months and a median of9 months. The age range was 14-53, with the mean and 
median by group listed in Table 2. There was a fairly even distribution of gender across the two 
groups, though females are over-represented in the sample as shown in Table 3. 
Table 2: Age distribution: 
SSRI No meds 
Mean 34 37 
Median 31 34 
Table 3: Gender distribution: 
SSRI No meds 
Female 14 13 
Male 6 7 
2.1.3. Presence/length of dream report 
Despite the fact that the Hall & Van de Castle standardized content analysis is not designed to be 
performed on dreams less than a specified word count, usually 50 (Domhoff, 2003), patients were 
included whether or not they completed a dream report and regardless of length, since exclusion 













Of the 5 SSRl's included in this study fluoxetine (12), citalopram (4), paroxetine (4) and 
sertraline (l) were represented. No patients were prescribed fluvoxamine. Duration of SSRl 
treatment ranged from one month to five years, with a mean of 16 months. Thase (1998) notes 
that of all the antidepressants, the SSRl's are noted for negatively impacting on sleep 
maintenance, and that insomnia is a frequent consequence. This is just one of the reasons that 
SSRl prescription is frequently accompanied by concurrent prescription of sedatives such as the 
benzodiazepines, another is that despite their prescription for anxiety, the SSRl's initially may 
cause anxiety and agitation (Boyer & Feighner, 1998) making study of the effects ofSSRl's alone 
in patient populations a practical impossibility. Argyropoulos, Sandford & Nutt (2000) state that it 
is common practice to prescribe benzodiazepines in the initial stages of treatment (usually two 
weeks) with SSRI's due to widespread findings of initial jitteriness and a temporary increase in 
symptoms of anxiety. Given their addictive potential it is perhaps not surprising that some 
patients were still taking benzodiazepines long into SSRl treatment, despite an indication that 
benzodiazepines were generally prescribed only for the first 2 weeks of SSRI treatment. 
Benzodiazepines modulate the activity of GABA neurotransmitters, \vhich may in turn have 
effects on either transmission or synthesis of other neurotransmitters such as noradrenalin 
(Gaillard, 1994a). In ternlS of impact on sleep and dreaming, the benzodiazepines are known to 
decrease sleep latency and increase REM latency, though REM density is not suppressed overall 
and no REM rebound is observed. NREM is altered in various ways depending on the specific 
benzodiazepine concerned, with time spent in some stages increased and others decreased, and 
with alterations in the physiology of sleep stages (waveforms, body movements and other phasic 
events) as well as the number of shifts between sleep stages (Gaillard, 1994b). These studies 
showed no significant reduction in number of dreams recalled, though Perry and Young (2001) 
report that dreaming is diminished with sedative use in general, under which heading they have 
included the benzodiazepines. One study noted less dream bizarreness with Nitrazepam (Roth, 
Kramer & Salis, 1979). Given all of the above, it would have been preferable to exclude patients 
on benzodiazepines, but difficult in terms of patient numbers in any population outside the 
volunteer (non-psychiatric) population. To diminish the potential of a confounding presence in 
this sample, there are equal numbers of patients in each group that are taking benzodiazepines (5 











2.1. 5. Social stressors 
As previously mentioned, the Groote Schuur outpatient clinic serves a population group 
representing largely those of a low socio-economic grouping, and as a result sees many patients 
who face overwhelming social stressors. These include domestic violence, parents with children 
in unsafe environments in which gang activity frequently results in bystander injuries, 
unemployment and substance abuse. 
2.2. Procedure 
A questionnaire was devised to obtain measures of dreaming frequency, visual vividness and 
emotional intensity with a view to being able to compare the results with those of the Pace-Schott 
et al. (2001) study. In addition, each participant was requested to supply a most recent dream 
report, in order to perform external ratings of dream intensity. This was done according to the 
format recommended by Domhoff (2003), in which a standardized directive is given the 
respondent, asking for date of the dream, and asking the respondent to pay attention to all aspects 
of the dream, such as its setting, familiarity and feelings experienced. The next section is devoted 
to a discussion of the rationale for the construction of the questionnaire and plans for subsequent 
analysis. 
2.2.1. Operationalising the dependent variables vividness and intensity 
Various authors have made statements regarding dreaming intensity and vividness, whether in 
relation to drug use, which is the focus of this research, whether in comparing RE\1 with NREM 
dreams, whether as part of a broader content analysis, or whether in relation to REM rebound 
(Hobson et al., 2000b). Few of the studies reviewed attempt a definition of either intensity or 
vividness and fewer still have specified a method by which actual dream reports may be 
objectively rated for intensity. Most rely on an intuitive understanding of the terms intensity and 
vividness, though vividness is sometimes qualified as visual vividness and intensity as emotional 
intensity. In a 1998 study by Schredl and Doll, the terms intensity and emotional intensity are 
used interchangeably throughout the paper, as they are in the Meier, Ruef, Ziegler and Hall 
(1968) study. Hobson et aL (2000b) in attempting to answer the question of whether intense 
dreaming is confined largely to REM sleep, confusingly proceed to discuss dream length as 
though this were the same thing as intensity. Meier et al (1968) set the criteria which dream 











which there was the presence of conflict, misfortune, dramatic events or strong emotion, thus 
providing a similar working definition to that of Schredl and Doll (1998) in that intensity appears 
restricted to the emotional sphere. In the Hall and Vande Castle (1966) method of content 
analysis, dream intensity is not explicitly defined, though it is measured through the identification 
of modifiers that are used to describe force or expenditure of energy. Various authors repeat the 
assertion that REM dreams are more vivid and intense than NREM dreams; one should be aware 
that such usage often relies on an intuitive understanding of the psychological constructs 
concerned and the meaning may vary from author to author (see Nielsen, 2000, Feinberg, 2000). 
The Oxford dictionary (1994, p.898) defines 'vivid' as '1. bright and strong, intense, .... 2. 
producing strong and clear mental pictures', whereas 'intense' is defined as 'strong in quality or 
degree', and 'intensity' as 'the amount of some quality' (p.416). These are fairly useful 
guidelines, though different from those provided by the authors described above. Whereas 
vividness and intensity are sometimes used interchangeably in dream descriptions, the Oxford 
definition appears to assigns a visual component to the definition of vividness (,providing strong 
and clear mental pictures'). The word intensity is relegated a more quantitative role as descriptor 
- as the strength, amount or degree of the impression or feeling. Perhaps this explains why the use 
of both terms is common, as one would presumably wish to capture the strength of emotions as 
well as the strength of visual imagery when speaking of intensity. Particularly where vividness 
and intensity are used interchangeably, it seems likely that intensity refers to the strength of a 
visual impression as well as the strength of a feeling. 
2.2.1.1. Self report measures of vividness and imensity 
Preferring not to reinvent the wheel, and since this research is intended in large measure to 
complement the findings of Pace-Schott et a1 (2001), it was hoped to use the same approach to 
rating vividness and intensity. In their discussion section, they refer to observing an increase in 
five out of seven 'intensity related' characteristics of dreaming. These are memorability, visual 
vividness, amount of sound, emotional intensity, meaningfulness, amount of movement and 
strangeness, all self-report likert-scaled measures. It is not specified how the authors arrived at 
this particular set of descriptors as indicators of intensity, though it appears in line the Oxford 
dictionary meaning in terms of measuring the strength of various impressions - auditory, visual, 











use deals specifically with intensity and vividness, and since it was considered important to 
minimize the number of questions posed to participants, it was therefore decided to restrict the 
questions to these two most salient components of this scale, emotional intensity and visual 
vividness, plus the memorability item, due to the reported link between dream intensity and 
memorability (Domhoff, 2003). Since the aim was to compare our findings, these items were 
used verbatim from the Pace-Schott et al. (2001) questionnaire. The self-report questions posed to 
the participants were as follows: 
How often do you dream? (every night, most nights, about half the time, occasionally, never). 
This is followed by the most recent dream report as set out by Domhoff (2003), whereafter three 
questions about that dream are posed: 
How memorable was your dream? 
Most memorable ever 1 2 3 4 5 can only remember that I did dream 
How visually vivid was your dream? 
lv/os! vivid ever 2 3 4 5 not at all vivid 
How emotionally intense was your dream? 
AIost intense ever 1 2 3 4 5 not at all intense 
Following this set of directed questions, an open-ended question was posed verbally in which 
participants were asked if there was anything else they would like to add about their dreams. In 
this question it was hoped to elicit spontaneous observations regarding changes in dreaming while 
using SSRI's. It was not possible to ask all participants this question as many participants were 
not interviewed in person. In retrospect it may have yielded more interesting results had this 
open-ended question been included in the questionnaire itself from the outset. 
2.2.1.2. External ratings of dream intensity 
Certain authors are mistrustful of self-report measures (Domhoff, 2003), quantitative researchers 
generally prefer independent ratings of the dream reports. Domhoff (2003) argues that self-report 
in dreams is in theory at least, less open to impression management than reports of wakiJ:lg 
actions, since dreamers do not feel personally responsible for their dreams, as they do their 
waking actions. Despite this, in content analysis he found that self rated vs. independent rated 











interactions the dreamer provided does not tally with the description of the dream itself. Domhoff 
(2003) appears to conclude it is the self-report that is umeliable, but it is also plausible that the 
dreamer may have experienced an interaction as more or less friendly or aggressive than 
independent raters might argue them to be. This is even more likely to be the case where 
descriptors about the dream as a whole are concerned, especially if they are not part of the . 
episodic narrative, such as the general mood of the dream or strength of visual impressio'ns or 
emotions. 
2.2.1.2.1. Precedents/or independent ratings o/vividness and intensity 
Since a number of studies refer to dreams as being more or less vivid or intense than others it was 
hoped that there was some precedent in independently rating the dream reports as such. This is the 
case for only a small minority of studies. Markowitz's four patients are described as having newly 
'vivid' dreams; this is based on self-report of a qualitative nature. Momoe et al (1965) also argue 
REM dreams to be more vivid than NREM dreams but provide no definition or method by which 
this is objectively measured. Aside from the Hall and van de Castle (1966) system which 
measures intensity, and which will be discussed in some detail, Domhoff (2003) also mentions 
four studies that had attempted to objectively rate dream intensity. Each of these studies will be 
briefly examined. 
In the earliest of these studies, by Baekeland & Lasky (1968), an assertion is made that REM 
density is an indirect measure of dream intensity. It seems safe to assume that their definition of 
intensity simply reflects the then-uncontested view of REM sleep and dreaming as isomorphic. In 
this way dream intensity and REM density (the quantity of RHv! sleep) could be equated. 
Meier, Ruef, Ziegler and Hall (1968) performed an analysis of the dreams of one subject in which 
emotional intensity was rated on a four-point scale by the dreamer, with the external rater being 
the dreamer's psychiatrist. We have mentioned their definition of an intense dream above, as one 
in which there was presence of impulse, conflict, strong emotion, misfortune and dramatic events, 
thereby tapping only the emotional sphere. Aside from the problem of their definition being 
overly restrictive for our own purposes, it is also problematic that the 'independent' rater was the 
subject's psychiatrist. The subject and the psychiatrist reached an 88% agreement on their ratings 











which this particular subject is likely to find conflictual or distressing. It is quite possible that a 
truly independent rater will come to a different conclusion. 
Takeuchi, Ogilvie, Ferelli, Murphy and Belicki (2001) created a dream property scale, which 
purportedly measures vividness. Here vividness is mentioned by comparison with Cohen's (1979) 
dream categories of emotionality, bizarreness, activity and vividness, which purportedly 
correspond with the Takeuchi et al scale's four factors of emotionality, bizarreness, activity and 
impression. Their factor of 'impression', which is said to correspond with Cohen's vividness 
property is comprised of the following descriptors: fuzzy vs. clear, unfocused vs. focused and 
foggy vs. clarity. The Cohen (1979) paper refers the reader to an earlier study (Cohen and 
Macneilage, 1974) for a description of how their four dream properties are defined and measured. 
Here, the authors describe vividness as 'sensory impact', which broadens the scope beyond visual 
impact. No further information is provided in this paper as to what questions were framed in order 
to establish a vividness score, however it is stated that this was obtained through a series of self-
report questions. 
T rinder and Kramer (1971) operationalised dream intensity as the sum of a number of dream 
content variables as measured using the Hall and Van de Castle system, which is discussed below. 
These variables were social interactions, emotions, achievement outcome and 'environmental 
press', the meaning of which is unclear. These variables were combined to produce what was 
termed a 'dramatic intensity' scale. 
2.2.1.2.2. Hall and Van de Castle's content analysis 
The Hall and Van de Castle (1966) content analysis system is perhaps the best-known method of 
quantitative analysis and has been adopted by Domhoff (2003) as a standard in the quantitative 
analysis of dream content. Hall and Van de Castle (1966) noted that prior dream research used 
intensity interchangeably with frequency, usually of a certain type of interaction (They provide an 
example to illustrate - that someone who has a lot of aggressive interactions in their dreams 
allows for the interpretation that there is 'intense' aggression in the dream). What they seem to be 
saying is that intensity per se had not been rated in previous dream research (prior to 1966) but 
rather it was the intensity of a particular construct that was of interest. Hall and Vande Castle 











(p.14). Later in the same text however they do just that, as they operationalise intensity using a 
series of modifiers that are used to describe force or expenditure of energy. The Hall and Van de 
Castle (1966) system of dream content rating uses the intensity 'modifier' as either high or low 
intensity. In this way, a word such as 'very' or 'extremely' modifies an emotion such as sadness 
allowing the emotion to be coded high intensity, or whereas a word such as 'mildly' 
dO\\>l1grades the emotion to low intensity or 1-. Each intensity modifier is listed as either I+ or 1-; 
in this way a dream could have two 1- and three I.J... modifiers listed. No subsequent step is taken in 
the rating process to evaluate a dream as more or less intense than another though it is apparent 
that should one wish to do so, one simply has to total the modifiers to arrive at a score of for 
example I where there are two negative and one positive modifiers. Intensity modifiers need not 
refer to emotion, for example a bright light attracts an 1+ in this system. The number of positive 
and negative intensity modifiers may be compared with norms, which are separate for males and 
females. 
The original Hall and Van de Castle (1966) text provides an example to illustrate what can or 
cannot be viewed as an intensity modifier. In this example (Hall & Van de Castle, 1966 p.120), 
the authors assign an I+ to words such as 'very' or 'extremely'. However they do not allow an 1+ 
for words such as 'furious' since 'simple mention of an emotion usually associated with a strong 
effect is not sufficient for coding' (p.l20). This lends itself to a situation in which one individual 
might describe an interaction stating the person was 'very cross' and another, arguably more 
linguistically sophisticated, might describe the same situation stating the person was 'furious'. 
According to the Hall and Van de Castle system, only the former description may be assigned an 
intensity rating. This unfortunately undermines the validity of the construct as used by their 
system. An attempt was therefore made to modify the Hall and Vande Castle method to allow 
such descriptors, but soon ran into the kind of trouble that presumably led to their exclusion. In an 
attempt to establish inter-rater reliability on these descriptors, it became clear that a scale would 
be required in order to establish correspondence of every extant adjective with a degree of 
intensity - for example agreement could be reached that 'furious' scores an but is 'annoyed' 
an I-? Is 'cross' neutral? These are not problems that can be satisfactorily resolved, therefore one 
is forced back on the compromise that Hall and Van de Castle used the exclusion of these 











intensity, though raters agreed that on a subjective rating of the dream, this should score highly 
for intensity. 
"It was a dream about me and afriend being raped, and I couldn't reach out to help her and 
there was no way that 1 could help her. 1 wanted to go back into the dream so that 1 could take 
revenge." 
This dream describing an extremely unpleasant experience scores no points since there is no 
contextualisation allowed to take part in the rating process, no allowance for negative events (no 
verbs) such as rape or assault, and no allowance for the repetition of phrases. The dreamer has not 
told us she felt 'very' scared, which could have scored an I+ but if she had said she was 'terrified' 
she would have still not scored an I+. Raters agreed that this scores at least a 4 out of 5 on a 
subjective intensity rating, as we infer from the nature of rape per se, as well her intention to take 
revenge that intense feelings would be taken as given. 
2.2.1. 2. 3. The Schredl and Doll study 
Schredl and Doll (1998) attempted an objective investigation into dream emotion using Hall and 
Van de Castle's rating system. Aside from the fact that emotion, intensity and emotional intensity 
are conflated in their study, their self-report measurement of dream emotion, both positive and 
negative, had an extremely poor correlation with independently rated measurement of positive 
and negative emotion, using the Hall and Van de Castle system. They show that judges 
consistently under-rate the number of emotions in the dream report, and typically over-rate the 
amount of negative emotion relative to positive emotions as compared to the dreamers evaluation 
of the dream. In their study, a comparison was made between self-rating of positive emotion, 
independent rating of positive emotion and the Hall and Van de castle system's rating of positive 
emotion. Good inter-rater reliability was obtained on the Hall and Van de Castle system 
measures, but this had a correlation of only .362 for positive and .2 for negative emotions with the 
self report measures. External rating on a scaled system of independent rater evaluation produced 
better correlation with self report measures at .557 for positive emotions and .669 for negative 
emotions, but inter-rater reliability was not reported. In both cases (external scaled and Hall & 
Van de Castle rated) the overall amount of emotion and amount of positive emotion was 











Following the original Hall and Van de Castle rules strictly with regard to rating intensity it is 
easy to see how one could attain very good inter rater reliability, and nevertheless produce 
meaningless results. This is not to discredit their system in its entirety; the Hall and Van de Castle 
system is intended as a system of content analysis, and content variables lend themselves better to 
measurement (e.g. how many strangers vs. known people were in the dream). Domhoff (2003) 
has shown that using the system, various dream content variables can be demonstrated to have 
continuity with the dreamer's waking life, therefore demonstrating the validity of the method for 
content analysis. Intensity is not a content variable however, rather a characteristic of the dream 
as a whole. 
2.2.1.2.4. Approaching an independent rating of dream intensity 
With the foregoing in mind, in attempting an objective rating of intensity from the dream report, 
we took a similar approach to Schredl & Doll (2000), and decided to use a to use a rater-assigned 
likert scaled intensity score for the dream as a whole. After some discussion among the raters, it 
was agreed that a four-point likert scale would be used, with the values defined as follows: 
Not at all intense 
2 - A bit intense 
3 - Very intense 
4 Extremely intense 
Two raters were employed to analyse the dream reports, and were instructed that the Oxford 
dictionary definition of intensity would be used, as the strength of some impression. They were 
explicitly instructed not to restrict this to emotional intensity but also the strength of any 
impression. Raters were blind as to whether the dream reports came from experimental or control 
patients. A person other than these raters typed all dream reports up prior to distribution. Inter-
rater reliability was first obtained on dreams that had been excluded from the study due to 
incompatible medication or psychopathology. Inter-rater reliability was calculated using 











2.3. Data Analysis 
The self-report likert-scaled data, as well as the externally rated intensity measure were compared 
between the experimental and control groups using t-tests. Domhoff (2003) prefers to restrict data 
analysis in dream reports to nonparametric tests such as chi-squared with nominal categories. He 
argues that nominal systems are better than parametric analysis with ordinal rating scales treated 
as interval data, in which a score of 4 cannot be shown to be twice a score of 2. On the other hand 
Durrheim (1999) argues that treatment of the same data by parametric or nonparametric means 
often yields similar results. For this reason he argues that nonparametric statistics should be 
reserved for categorical data. We have therefore proceeded as per the Pace-Schott et a1. (2001) 
study, treating the ordinal data as interval data and proceeding with parametric statistics (in their 
case repeated measure ANOVA was used to compare the likert-scaled responses across the four 
treatment stages). Independent sample t-tests were performed comparing the responses from the 












A total of 46 dream reports were obtained from the 40 subjects. 5 patients recalled no dream, 3 
from the experimental group and 2 from the control group. Three patients contributed more than 
one dream report, two of whom were taking SSRI's and one without medication. 
T -tests were performed using Statistica 6.1 in order to establish whether any differences exist 
between the SSRI group and the control group on the four self-report variables obtained, as well 
as the independently rated measure of intensity. For the sake of completeness, the Mann-Whitney 
test for non-parametric data was also performed. Where data is absent for a particular dependent 
variable, that case is omitted, hence slightly variable sample sizes from test to test. Reported 
values are rounded to 3 decimal places. 
3.1. Self-report lUeaSllres 
3.1.1. Frequency 
On the self reported measure of frequency, no difference was found between the two groups, 
moreover there was not even a trend, as can be seen below: 
T-Test: 
Mean SSRI Mean Controlt-value df p Valid N Valid N 
Frequency 2.211 2.474 -0.689 36 0.495 19 19 
Mann-\Vhitney: 
Rank Sum Rank Sum U Z p-Ievel Valid N Valid N 
Frequency 349.000 392.000 159.000 -0.627 0.530 19 19 
3.1.2. Memorability 
On the self report measure of memorability, there vvas no statistically significant ditTerence 
T-Test: 
Mean SSRI Mean Controlt-value Df p Valid N Valid N 
DMemorable 2.412 2.3890.057 33 0.955 17 18 
Mann-Whitney: 
Rank Sum Rank Sum U Z p-Ievel Valid N Valid N 











J 1. J Vis'ual Vividness 
On the self- report measure of visual vividness, there was a statistically significant difference at 
the p=.05 level both using at-test (p=0.027) and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney (p=0.029). 
Effect size was calculated as the difference between the means divided by either standard 
deviation as per Howell (1999). This was calculated as (2.412-1.722)/0.795 0.86. The standard 
deviation for the control group was used. at .795. Pace-Schott et al (2001) use a slightly difTerent 
formula. averaging the two standard deviations. Using their formula we v·/Ould obtain a slightly 
stronger result. (2.412-1. 722/0. 779 = 0.88). 
T-Test: 
Mean SSRI Mean Cantralt-value df p Valid N Valid N 
Dvivid 2.412 1.722 2.309 330.027 17 18 
Mann-'Whitney: 
RankSum RankSum u Z P Valid N Valid N 
Dvivid 372.000 258.000 87.000 2.178 0.029 17 18 
3.1. -I. Emotional Intensify 
Dreams were not rated as significantly different on the self report measure of emotional intensity. 
(p> 0.05) 
T -test: 
Mean SSRI Mean Control:t-valueDf p Valid N Valid N 
Dintense 2.294 2.500 -0.43033 0.669 17 18 
Mann-Whitney: 
Rank Sum Rank Sum U Z p-Ievel Valid N Valid N 
Dintense 296.000 334.000 143.000 -0.330 0.741 17 18 
3.2. Independent measures 
Independent raters assessment of intensity was not significantly ditTerent across the two groups. 
T-Test: 
Mean SSRI Mean Control t-value df p Valid N Valid N 












Rank Sum Rank Sum U Z p-Ievel Valid N Valid N 
Independantlntense 572.000 418.000 187.000 1.281 0.200 23 21 
3.3. Correlation between measures of self reported intensity vs Independent rating 
A self-report measure of overall intensity was calculated using a combination of the three 
intensity sub-measures, viz; memorability, visual vividness and emotional intensity. This value 
was correlated with the independent measure of intensity. There \vas no relationship between the 
independently rated likert-scaled intensity and self-reported likert-scaled intensity measures 
(Pearson-s r c.:; p >.05). Broken down by group, the correlation coefficient for the SSRI group 
\vas r = -0.30, p>.05 and for the control group r =-0.22, p>.05. 
3.4. Qualitative data 
23 of the 40 respondents \vere asked whether there was anything they \vOltld like to add about 
their dreaming. Of these, five had nothing to add. A further six respondents made comments that 
are not useful for our analysis, such as one report that a person had ahvays had premonitory 
dreams, another discussing recuning dreams that they had, and the remainder descri bing sleep 
rather than dream disturbances. 
Of the 12 responses that held useful data, 8 \vere from patients \\'ho were on SSRJ medication and 
4 who were not. Of these 4, one complained of having mostly upsctting dreams, and another 
reported that they hardly ever dreamed. The other two who were not taking SSRl's had previously 
taken fluoxetine, but had terminated therapy some time ago. One claimed that . [ dreamt more 
vividly when I was on fluoxetine', and the other stated 'I dream less since offfluoxetine. my 
dreams were more vivid, stronger and more often on the meds·. 
'rhe comments from the 8 patients taking SSRl's may be summarized as follows: 
Two reported more frequent dreaming 
Two reported more 'realistic' dreaming 
Two reported more unpleasant dreams and nightmares 
One reported more 'complicated' dreams 
One stated that she had always had detailed dreams. This patient had only been on SSRJ's 











One reported hypnopompic phenomenon in \vhich her dreams and waking reality sometimes 
became confused. Her comments were' Sometimes I wonder if a dream really happened, I can 
get quite confused sometimes, it can be quite upsetting if I can'1 work it out.' This person had 
been taking fluoxetine for 3 years. 
Table 4: Qualitative responses by SSRI and therapy duration 
Patient Response SSRI ltion 
LG More frequent Fl 1 y1', 6 months 
PH More frequent Citalopram 1 11h 
PH More realistic Citalopram 1 month 
EV More realistic Fluoxetine I year 
TK M, unpleasant Fluoxetine 3 years 
unpleasant Paroxetine 2 yrs, 6 months 
NW More icated Fluoxetine 4 months 
~ 
MH Always detailed Fluoxetine 1 month 
AM Hypnopompic Fluoxetine • 3 yrs 
It was unfOliunately not possible to pinpoint differences between the different drugs, as there 
were not sufficient proportions of each drug to carry out statistical analysis. As previously 
mentioned, the majority of participants were on tluoxetine, since generics of this drug tend to be 
cheaper and more readily available from State facilities. Nevertheless for interest. a table (Table 
4) is provided detailing the responses, the corresponding SSRI and the duration of SSRI therapy. 
Note that one patient (PH) described dreams that were both more realistic and more frequent; this 












4.1. Self Report measures 
Of the self report measures that were taken from the Pace-Schott et al (2001) study for use as 
indicators of intensity, only visual vividness came up as significantly higher for the experimental 
group (p 0.027), with memorability, emotional intensity and frequency of dreaming emerging as 
not significantly different across the two groups. The effect size for visual vividness at .86 is 
considered large according to Cohen's rule of thumb (Howell, 1999), and this should therefore be 
regarded as a solid finding. Domhoff (2003) in fact argues that effect sizes of more than .40 
should be considered large in dream research. 
4.2. Independent ratings of intensity 
There was no statistically significant difference between the group taking SSRI's and the control 
group on the measure of independently rated intensity. Despite good inter-rater agreement in 
terms of what constitutes an intense dream, it was apparent that there is an extremely poor 
correlation between the dreamers self-report of intensity (as measured using a combination of 
memorability, emotional intensity and visual vividness) and independently rated assessment of 
the intensity of the dream report (r=-.27). Looking back at the Meier et al (1968) study in which 
the psychiatrist rated his subject's dreams and was guided by personal history as context, it is 
instructive that where the process of obtaining inter-rater agreement was lacking in consensus in 
our own study, it was around precisely the issue of personal salience. Raters frequently felt a 
dream described some level of misfortune but that the dreamer had not conveyed their O'WTI 
subjective sense of distress. As an example, in this dream the dreamer assigned the highest rating 
for emotional intensity: 
"/ dreamed about my sister's son, he passed away last year. / dreamed he helped me with my 
kitchen, putting in some new furniture. " 
Since the rater does not know what relationship the dreamer had with the sister's son, and aside 
from the mention of his being dead, no account of distress was given, the rater assigned this the 
lowest intensity rating (Not at all intense). This correlates poorly with the self"report measure of 











measures of intensity, the inclination is therefore to revert to Hall and Vande Castle's 1966 initial 
assertion that perhaps it is a psychological construct that cannot reliably be objectively assessed 
in a narrative. This lack of correspondence is in our opinion inherent in the task itself rather than a 
function of our sample, which would lead us to expect that the same problem would result in any 
replication attempt with a different sample. Therefore, despite Domhoffs (2003) reservations 
regarding self report, one is inclined to take the phenomenological route, and assert that at least in 
this dream series, dreamers have for whatever reasons, not successfully managed to convey their 
subjective sense of a dream's intensity in their report of the dream. The fact that visual vividness 
was found to be highly significant whereas frequency, emotional intensity and memorability were 
not at all significant militates against potential impression management where self - report is 
concerned. 
4.3. Qualitative information 
The qualitative responses follow the same pattern as the quantitative data, with two comments 
regarding increased frequency on SSRl medication (20 % of those that were asked the open-
ended question), and a larger number of comments (seven) stating that dreams were more 
realistic, more vivid, more complicated and sometimes more unpleasant on SSRl treatment. It is 
of interest here that in Solms' (1997) study, patients used the term 'realistic' interchangeably with 
'vivacity' and 'perceptual clarity' in describing their dream imagery. If one considers the 
comments regarding vividness, realistic, complicated, nightmarish and hypnopompic 
phenomenon collectively as indicators of more vivid and intense dreaming, comments regarding 
increased vividness and intensity represent 70 percent of SSRl users that were posed this open 
ended question. This excludes the two comments regarding increased vividness when taking 
SSRl's made by control group patients that had previously taken SSRl's, since not all of the 
control group patients had previously been on medication. None of the control group patients 
spontaneously described their current dreams in these terms. It should be reiterated that the 
question was posed directly after the written questions eliciting self report information about 
dream intensity, vividness and memorability, and it is possible that some degree of experimenter 












Using similar bases of comparison, this study has replicated the main findings of the work of 
Pace-Schott et al (2001), in that self reports of visual vividness are higher in users of SSRl' s 
whereas frequency of dreaming is not increased in SSRl users. Unlike the Pace-Schott study we 
did not find differences in memorability or emotional intensity, even as a trend. It should be 
stressed that there are substantial differences in our respective studies; the Pace-Schott et al study 
uses 7 subjects in each group whereas ours uses 20 in each, and that their study uses a repeated 
measures design for purposes of comparison, whereas ours is cross sectional, using a non-
medicated control group for comparison. Finally the mean duration of treatment in our study was 
far longer at 16 months (compared with 19 days). 
The 'modulation' component of Hobson's AIM model would predict that increased serotonin, the 
primary effect of SSRl administration, should lead to a reduction in frequency as well as 
vividness and intensity of dreaming through the suppression of REM sleep. The evidence does not 
support this theory on either count, despite the fact that the SSRl's do strongly suppress REM 
sleep. Frequency of dreaming on the one hand remains the same across users of SSRI medication 
and those not taking SSRl's. Self-reported visual vividness is increased in SSRl users, a 
movement in the opposite direction to what the AI'Y1 model predicts, and emotional intensity is 
not significantly different in our study. 
4.5. Limitations 
4.5.1. Education and socio-economic factors 
The dream reports obtained were taken from individuals who for the most part had no tertiary 
education, and came from a low SES background. This might potentially impact on the nature of 
the dream reports obtained. It may be that with a group from low SES communities in which 
poverty, poor living conditions, substance abuse and gang violence is rife, that it is not unlikely 
for dream life to take a backseat. One cannot be sure that with a relatively 'unpsychologized' 
sample, terms such as 'intensity' and 'vividness' are understood in the same way that they might 
be by, for example, college students. Hobson et al. (2000a) point out that word count is also 
dependent on the language skills of the individual. This may account for the fact that many of the 
dream narratives (13 out of the total 46 dreams) were shorter than are usually considered adequate 











prefers to use reports of similar length for content analysis as he argues that word count has 
correlations with other rating scales (it would be unsurprising to find correlations between word 
count and level of education for example). Therefore as an exercise, word count was correlated 
with all the dependent variables (frequency, memorability, visual vividness, emotional intensity), 
nothing approaching significance was found. 
4.5.2. Use oj Normal, paid volunteers vs. psychiatric participants 
There are advantages to conducting research amongst the psychiatric popUlation; since this is the 
population from whom the case reports arose in the first place and since they are already taking 
the drug one wishes to research. The disadvantages are that with the high co-morbidity of 
depression with anxiety disorders, there may have been patients in the experimental group with 
co-morbid depression that dreamed more than they did prior to taking SSRl's. In addition there 
may have been patients in the control group with depression that dreamed less than they would 
have if they had been undergoing drug or other therapy. Another problem with the psychiatric 
population is the co-administration of other medication, as well the impossibility of screening out 
unreported substance abuse, which has a higher incidence amongst the psychiatrie population 
(Kaplan & Saddoek, 2003). As Pace-Schott et al (2001) noted however it is costly conducting 
research of this nature with volunteers, who are paid for their participation and provided 
expensive drugs. For this reason those authors were forced to treat their study as a pilot, limiting 
their sample to 14 volunteers, 7 in each group, and consequently limiting the scope of possibilities 
for statistical analysis. 
4,53 Complexity oJneurotransmitter systems 
We have discussed the activity of the aminergic and cholinergic systems as though 
neurotransmitters operated as discrete entities and exerted unitary effects, for the purpose of 
illustrating that a substance that suppresses REM would not also be expected to increase dreaming 
according to the dominant view. This oversimplification may obscure the fact that the various 
neurotransmitter systems influence one another, for example GAB A (an inhibitory 
neurotransmitter) is known to inhibit activity in the locus ceruleus, which produces noradrenalin 
(Gaillard, 1994a). These interactions may occur in rather complex ways, for example serotonin 
release from raphe nuclei inhibits dopamine production in the midbrain but simultaneously 











neurotransmitter system on another is also state dependent, as for example in the noradrenergic 
activation of dopaminergic neurons during attention but not during sleep states (Gottesman, 
1999). Gaillard (1994b) also suggests that since a single neuron may produce both 
neurotransmitters and neuropeptides it is possible that the peptide acts as a 'co transmitter' to 
modulate or fine-tune the action of the neurotransmitter at the synapse. Substance P for example 
is consistently found together with serotonin (Perry & Young, 2001). Increased levels of a 
neurotransmitter such as acetylcholine in the brainstem, certainly does not imply increased 
forebrain levels of acetylcholine, indeed it is possible to have decreased levels of cholinergic 
activity in one part of the forebrain such as the hippocampus, but not other parts such as 
neocortex, as is found in Alzheimers disease (Perry & Perry, 1995). Gaillard (1994b) thus 
cautions against simplistic models of the effects of drugs on sleep and dreaming characteristics 
due to the level of interaction among neurotransmitters and neuronal pathways, leading (0 
'cascades of changes in which it is difficult to identify the primary effect' (p.336). Gaillard et al 
(1994) and Gottesmann (1999) also warn against extrapolation of findings in rats and other small 
mammals (in whom a majority of sleep research has been conducted) to humans, in whom the 
neuronal system is considerably more complex. At least one study has found a significant 
discrepancy in the activity of cholinergic enzymes in the human brain as opposed to the rodent 
(Perry & Perry, 1995). 
4.5.4. Heterogeneity of the SSRI's 
With respect to the foregoing, two issues are of concern with regard to medication; the first. the 
concurrent use ofbenzodiazepines has been discussed, though mitigated by equal numbers in 
each group. A further concern is that if we are to attempt to establish the neurochemical 
mechanisms involved in dreaming through a study of their effects in SSRI users, it is not an ideal 
approach to study heterogeneous drugs. Despite the fact that the SSRI's have in a gross sense, a 
similar mode of action, these drugs are not identical, for example citalopram is sometimes said to 
be 'cleaner' in the sense that it has very few direct effects on the levels of neurotransmitters other 
than serotonin (these effects are called secondary binding properties), whereas paroxetine for 
example has anticholinergic properties, mild dopamine reuptake occurs with sertraline, and 
noradrenalin reuptake occurs with fluoxetine. These secondary binding properties are considered 
important enough to have potential clinical consequences over and above the intended 











may be identified (Stahl, 2000). Perry & Piggott (2000) noted that one anti-Parkinson medication 
with affinity for D3 but not for DJ receptors led to more pronounced increases in dreaming 
intensity than L-dopa. Different SSRI's also have different strength of effects on different 
serotonin receptor subtypes (eg. 5HT IA vs. 5HT 2A), the functional differentiation of which is still 
in its early stages. In practice, the Pace-schott et al (2001) study showed that paroxetine and 
fluvoxamine appear to have behaved quite differently from one another with respect to dream 
frequency and word count when comparing baseline to initiation of treatment. The result is that 
any conclusions regarding neurotransmitter impact on dreaming characteristics through SSRl use 
run the risk of oversimplification of mechanisms that are as yet not fully understood. For this 
reason it would be recommend that any further investigation of increases in dreaming frequency 
or intensity be undertaken as part of larger clinical trials targeting specific SSRl compounds. In 
1979 Roth, Kramer and Salis lamented that in their review of the literature on the impact of drugs 
on dreaming, there had been no attempt to examine a single drug in any depth. The demand for 
newer and better antidepressants is likely to entrench this difficulty, ensuring that for any given 
patient popUlation, an ever broader range of alternatives is available; research using healthy 
volunteers thus seems the more promising way to study a single drug. 
4.6. Conclusions 
Despite apparently strong disagreement, differences in opinion regarding REM and dreaming 
seem to have been more pronounced in the past than cunently. There are cunently many common 
areas of agreement. There is more widespread acknowledgement of the role of the forebrain in 
dreaming, where Hobson's original activation synthesis model previously gave it the role of 
responding to random noise from the pontine brainstem, it is now accorded a more complex role. 
There also seems to be agreement that the later stages of sleep tend to produce more hal! '.1cinatory 
than thoughtlike material regardless of whether that stage is REM or NREM. In a recent article in 
which Hobson is a co-author (Fosse, Stickgold & Hobson, 2004), the authors go so far as to state 
that this " ... speaks to the variability of cognitive function in any sleep state". (p.302), and further 
that "the basic EEG differences between NREM and REM do not provide reliable correlates to 
the cognitive data" (p.302), though variation in muscle activity has been shown to correlate with 
the different types of sleep mentation. The authors conclude that the biological underpinnings of 
the changes in cognition from early to late night sleep remain unknown. This appears to represent 











as its psychophysiological correlate, when compared to his earlier statement that dreaming is an 
'epiphenomenon of REM sleep' (Hobson, Stickgold, & Pace-Schott, 1998, p.R12). Perhaps 
surprisingly there is even agreement regarding emotion as the probable shaper of dream content. 
Many authors (Kramer, 2000; Hobson et a1., 2000b) now consider pre-sleep emotion to be the 
primary shaper of dream content (in the same way it is, Hartmann (2000), argues, for waking 
daydreams). The role of the limbic system in the production of dream content is now a feature of 
both Hobson and Solms's dream theorizing, though Hobson cautions against drawing inferences 
from limbic involvement in dreaming towards assumptions of some sort of emotional processing 
aspect to dreaming. Finally it is commonly acknowledged that the role of cerebral activation 
needs to be considered in dream generation theories. 
On obtaining a finding of increased dream intensity in their earlier study, the Hobson team (Pace-
Schott et aI, 2001) posits a REM-rebound phenomenon to explain increases in their self-report 
measures of intensity with reduced REM. While REM rebound on discontinuation of SSRI' s is 
documented, a rebound effect during SSRI administration remains an as yet untested hypothesis. 
We conclude that whatever the reason for the increase in vivid dreaming, until this proposition is 
tested, the findings remain inconsistent with the REM=dreaming position. As far as the cerebral 
activation model is concerned, Solms (2004, personal communication) points out that the fact that 
ventromesial and PTO lesions disrupt dreaming also shows that cerebral activation is only one 
piece of the puzzle, and as a model it is therefore incomplete. The finding that increased serotonin 
leads to more vivid dreaming would also not have been predicted by theories of cerebral 
activation, since serotonin is regarded as having largely inhibitory effects (Gottesmann, 2001). 
There are some promising areas for investigation, such as Gottesmann' s (2001) emphasis on 
relative levels of the amines in sleep and dreaming, and also on elucidating the functions of the 
various neurotransmitter receptor sUbtypes. We may yet uncover receptor subtype functions in 
serotonergic transmission that act in an excitatory rather than an inhibitory manner with 
investigations into specific SSRI's rather than the class as a whole. The Fosse et al (2004) data on 
time of night in predicting the quality of sleep mentation also points to promising new areas for 
research. We concur with Nielsen and colleagues in concluding that the psychophysiological 
correlates of dreaming remain unclear (Esposito, Nielsen & Paquette, 2004), though if we are to 
move forward in uncovering these correlates, as Stickgold (2000, p.l 011) stated 'we should 
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APPENDIX 1 - Dream questionnaire 
Initials __ Age ___ Gender (M/F) ___ _ 
Date Today ____ _ 
Do you take these medications as they were prescribed? (YeslNo) __ 
If 'No\ please state the average daily dose actually taken _______________ _ 
How often do you dream? (circle the answer that best describes your recollections of having dreamed, 
even if you don't remember all the details) 
[EV:ery night I Most nights I About half the time i Occasionally I Never 
MOST RECENT DREAM 
We would like you to write down the last dream you remember having, whether it was last night, last 
month, or last year. But first please tell us the date this dream occurred: _______ _ 
Then tell us what time of day you think you recalled it: . Then tell us where 
you l}'ere when you recalled it: 
Please describe the dream exactly and as fully as you remember it. Your report should contain, 
whenever possible: a description of the setting of the dream, whether the setting was familiar to you or not; 
a description of the ~, their age, sex, and relationship to you; and any animals that appeared in the 
dream. If possible, describe your feelings during the dream and whether it was pleasant or 
unpleasant. Be sure to tell exactly what happened during the dream to you and the other 
characters. 











1. How memorable was your dream? 
most memorable ever 1 2 3 4 5 can only remember that I did dream 
2. How visually vivid was your dream? 
most vivid ever 1 2 3 4 5 not at all vivid 
3. How emotionally intense was your dream? 
most intense ever 1 2 3 4 5 not at all intense 
Thank you very much for participating in this study. 
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